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A. PRESENTATION Q£ ~PROBLEMS CONFRONTIN~ 
.I.!:iS COMPANY 
I • QpERAT I ONAL 
THE COMPANY Sl NCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR HAS BEEN FACED WITH THE 
TASK OF" MEETING AN UNPRECEDENTED DEMAND FOR ITS SERV I CES • THE EXTENT OF 
THIS DEMAND WAS SO GREAT THAT PREVIOUSLY UNUSED FACILITIES WERE COMPLETE-
LV INADEQUATE TO ABSORB IT• SUCCESSFUL ABSORPTION OF TH IS DEMAND REQUIR-
ED EXTENSIVE EXPANSION OF IT S FACILITIES AND AVAILABLE MANPOWER• WH ILE 
THrs DEMAND HAS NOT BEEN MET IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS 
IS TREMENDOUS, AS IS EVIDENCED BY TABLE I. 
TABLE 
SERVICE GROWTH Of COMPANY 
1940- 1949 
"J, OF 
1940 1949 INCREASE 
NuMBER Or TELEPHONES I ,294,557 2,183,718 68.6"/o 
NuMBER Of OR IGINATING CALLS 
PER DAY 6,428,277 10,698,759 66.4"/o 
NUMBER Of HELD ORDERS FOR 
NEW SERVICE 0 13,884 100. 
NuMBER Of HELD ORDERS FOR 
DIFFERENT SERVICE 0 180 ,150 100. 
SOURCE: NEw ENGLAND TELE PHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE FACILITIES WITH WHICH TO MEET THIS DE-
MAND, THE COMPANY HAD TO BORROW $ 143,300,000 FROM THE AMERICAN COMPANY. 
THESE LOANS WERE ALL TEMPORARY IN NATURE, BEING UNSECURED NOTES BEARING 
INTEREST RATES OF 2-3/4fo PAYABLE IN 12 MONTHS, OR EARLIER ON DEMAND• 
$40,000,000 HAS BEEN REPAID BY AN ISSUANCE OF A LIKE AMOUNT Or 35 YEAR 
DEBENTURES IN OcTOBER, 1947, LEAVING THE REMAINDER Or $ 103,000,000 TO 
BE REPAID• 
THIS INCREASE Or $ 143,300,000 INTO THE DEBT STRUCTURE OF THE 
COMPANY HAS CREATED A RATIO OF DEBT AND EQUITY TOWARDS TOTAL CAPITAL OF 
APPROXIMATELY 6~/o DEBT AND 4o% EQUITY• SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS FINAN-
CIALLY UNDESIRABLE SINCE FUTURE ADVERSE BUSINESS CONDITIONS COULD RE-
DUCE GROSS REVENUES TO THE LEVEL WHERE FIXED INTEREST COSTS COULD NOT BE 
RECOVERED• ALSO, SUCH A RELATIONSHIP BEING NOW SO HEAVILY WEIGHTED WITH 
DEBT, UNDERMINES THE ABILITY OF THE COMPANY TO BORROW IN THE FUTURE. IT 
IS ALSO A FACT THAT THE COST OF DEBT CAPITAL HAS AS ONE OF ITS DETERMIN-
ANTS THE DEGREE OF SPREAD BETWEEN DEBT AND TOTAL CAPITAL• THE NARROWER 
THE SPREAD, THE GREATER THE INTEREST CHARGE• 
To REDUCE TH E HAZARDS AND EXPENSE ATTENDANT WITH SUCH A DEBT 
STRUCTURE, THE COMPANY WILL HAVE TO OBTAIN EQUITY FUNDS WITH WHICH IT 
CAN PAY OFF THE EXCESS DEBT OF APPROXI MATELY $ 103,000,000. SucH A RE-
DUCTION WOULD RE-ESTABLISH THE COMPANY'S PRE-WAR RATIO OF ABOUT 35fo DEBT 
AND 65fo EQUITY· COMPANY MANAGEMENT BELIEVED THIS LATTER RATIO TO BE THE 
ONE THAT WI LL ENABLE THEM TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SOLVENCY AND POSSESS UN-
IMPAIRED CREDIT• 
HOWEVER, FOR THE COMPANY TO SECURE EQUITY FUNDS REQUIRES EARN-
ING POWER THAT IS SATISFACTORY IN THE OPINION OF INVESTORS• THIS SCRUTINY 
OF EARNING POWER HAS MADE THE STOCK OF THE COMPANY APPEAR UNATTRACTIVE 
AS AN INVESTMENT SECURITY• THE EXTENT Or THIS UNATTRACTIVENESS IS 
READILY PERCEIVED FROM TABLE I I. 
YEAR 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
TABLE II 
YEARLY STOCK PRICES 
COMPANY AND Dow-JONES UTILITIES 
AVERAGE P RICE 'fo CHANGE 
COMPANY* Dow-JONES ** COMPANY 
120.82 32 
129.78 38 6 
98-52 35 - 18.4 
87.70 35 - 27-4 
85.23 37 - 29-5 
SINCE 1945 
Dow-JONES 
18.9 
9.4 
9.4 
15.6 
SOURCE: * NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co. 
**SECUR ITIES RESEARCH CORPORATION, BosTON, MASS• 
As TABLE Jl SHOws, THE MARKET VALUE OF THE COMPANYts STOCK 
HAS DECREASED 29.$% FROM 1945 TO 1949. IN THE SAME PERIOD, OTHER REP-
RESENTATIVE UTILITIES HAVE INCREASED IN VALUE AN AVERAGE OF 15.6fo. SINCE 
LONG RANGE EARNING POWER POTENTIALITY IS THE MAuOR DETERMINANT OF UTILITY 
STOCK PRICES, IT SEEMS LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS DO 
EXIST IN THE UTILITY FIELD THAT INVESTORS CONSIDER AS HAVING BETTER 
EARNING PROSPECTS THAN DO THE SECURITIES OF THE COMPANY• As A STEP IN 
THE TASK TO ATTRACT THESE INVESTORS TO THEIR OWN EQUITY ISSUES, THE 
COMPANY HAS SOUGHT, AND IS SEEKING, THE PROPER RATE STRUCTURE REVIS-
IONS• 
2 
BEFORE THE COMPANY CAN ACTUALLY ATTEMPT TO ATTRACT THESE NEW 
INVESTMENT FUNDS BY THE SELLING OF NEW SHARES, THE MARKET PRICE OF ITS 
STOCK MUST BE APPRECIABLY ABOVE ITS PAR VALUE OF $100. ITS PRICE HAS 
ONLY TO EQUAL PAR TO SATISFY THE CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK, THE CHARTERING STATE OF THE COMPANY• * HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE 
POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL MARKET DECLINE AND THE DEPRESSING INFLUENCE THAT 
SALES OFFERINGS OF NEW SHARES HAS ON ITS OUTSTANDING SHARES, ITS PRICE 
MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ABOVE PAR SO THAT THESE AND OTHER FACTORS UNFAVOR-
ABLE TO SECURITY PRICES WILL NOT DRIVE THE PRICE OF THE COMPANY's STOCK 
BELOW ITS PAR, THEREBY STOPPING THE SALE• 
To BRING THE PRICE OF ITS STOCK ABOVE PAR, THE COMPANY NEEDS 
INCREASED EARNING POWER• THIS EARNING POWER, THAT IS SO ALL-IMPORTANT, 
IS SIMPLY THE DERIVATIVE OF A DEMAND AND A PRICE, COUPLED WITH WISE, 
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION• WE HAVE NOTED TABLE I, ILLUSTRATING THE DEMAND 
FOR THE SERVICES OF THE COMPANY• Irs ADMINISTRATIVE PRUDENCE HAS LONG 
BEEN RECOGNIZED• IT FOLLOWS THAT INADEQUATE PRICE FOR THESE SERVICES 
PREVENTS THE COMPANY F'ROM ATTAINING REASONABLE EARNING POWER F'OR THE EF-
FORTS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THEM• 
2. REGULATION 
REQUESTS HAVE BEEN MADE OF THE UTILITY COMMISSIONS IN THE FIVE 
STATES THAT THE COMPANY OPERATES F'OR RATE STRUCTURE REVISIONS• THE IN-
TENT OF' THESE REQUESTS WERE TO EFFECT INCREASES IN EARNINGS UP TO A LEVEL 
WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE COMPANY TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF ITS PRESENT 
* 13 p. 8 
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INVESTMENT, ATTRACT NEW EQUITY INVESTMENT FUNDS, AND INSURE CONTINUED 
HIGH QUAL I TIES OF SERVICE• 
THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE A RATE STRUCTURE WHICH WOULD EFFECT THE 
NECESSARY EARNINGS HAS BEEN CITED BY COURTS AND COMMISSIONS COUNTLESS 
TIMES• A COURT DECISION, THE HOPE NATURAL GAS CAsE, CITED MANY TIMES 
AS A NEW THOUGHT IN THE FIELD OF UTILITY REGULATION, REPEATED THAT RIGHT 
IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS: 
"FROM THE I NV EST OR OR COMPANY POl NT OF VIEW 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE ENOUGH REVENUT NOT ONLY 
FOR OPERATING EXPENSES BUT ALSO FOR THE CAPITAL COSTS 
Or THE BUSINESS• THESE INCLUDE SERVICE ON THE DEBT 
AND DIVIDENDS ON THE STOCK· (CF. CHICAGO & GRAND 
TRUNK Rv. Co. v WELLMAN, t43 u. S . 339, 345-346). Bv 
THAT STANDARD THE RETURN TO THE EQUITY OWNER SHOULD BE 
COMMENSURATE WITH RETURNS ON INVEST MENTS IN OTHER EN-
TERPRISES HAVING CORRE SPONDING RISKS• THAT RETURN, 
MOREOVER, SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ASSURE CONtiDENCE IN 
THE FINANCIAL INTEGRITY OF THE ENTERPRISE, SO AS TO 
MAINTAIN ITS CREDIT AND TO ATTRACT CAPITAL• SEE 
MISSOURI EX REL• SOUTHWESTERN BELL TEL• Co. V PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMM ISSION, 262 U. S. 276, 291 (MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS CONCURRING) •" * 
UTILITY COMMISSIONS IN THEIR DECISIONS HAVE DISAGREED WITH THE 
COMPANY AS TO WHAT EARNINGS ARE NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE COMPANY TO DIS-
CHARGE SUCCESSFULLY ITS DUTIES AS A PUBLIC UTILITY, WHILE ADEQUATELY RE-
WARDING ITS INVESTORS• THIS DISAGREEMENT EXTENDS TO I NCLUDE WHAT PROPOR-
TION OF THE COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE SHOULD BE DEBT• REGULATORS HAVE 
RULED THAT A LONG TERM DEBT RAT I 0 OF 4_% IS MORE REASONABLE THAN THE CoM-
PANY 1 S OB~ECTIVE OF 35% DEBT• THESE SITUATIONS RESULT FROM REGULATORS 
BEING PRONE TO ASSUME THE PAST TO BE THE PRESENT, WITH THE FUTURE, IN 
* 2 p. 399 
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THE IR OPINION, CERTAIN TO BE BRIGHTER THAN THE PAST• THE SUM TOTAL OF 
THIS APPROACH HAS BEEN TO IGNORE THAT THE PRESENT IS NOT THE PAST, AND 
THAT THE FUTURE IS ALWAYS IN DOUBT• 
SINCE 1945, THE PRICE LEVEL OF OUR ECONOMY HAS EXPERIENCED A 
MARKED UP WARD TREND• VARIOUS REPRESENTATIVE INDICES ATTEST TO THIS, SUCH 
AS THOSE IN TABLE I II. 
TABLE II I 
REPRESENTATIVE INDICES 
SHOWING RasE IN PRICE LEvEL 
1940-1949 
1935 - 1939 100 
INDEX 1940 1945 1949 
COsT OF LIVING 100.2 128 .4 I 69.1 
MET AL s-fV1ET AL PRODUCTS 95.8 J04.7 170.2 
BUILDING MATERIALS 94.8 117.8 193·3 
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS 81.6 101.8 151·2 
% INCREASE 
1949 OVER 1940 
68.9 
77-7 
I 03.9 
85.3 
SOURCE: FEDERAL RESERVE BuLLETIN, JUNE, 1950 
SURFACE OBSERVATIONS OF THESE INDICES, WITH THE REALIZATION 
THAT WAGES APPROXIMATE 65% OF THE COMPANY'S EXPENSES AND THAT THE POST 
WAR EXPANSION OF APPROXIMATELY $ 143,300,000 BOUGHT LESS TELEPHONE PLANT 
THAN WOULD A LIKE AMOUNT FURNISHED BEFORE THE WAR, SHOULD PRECLUDE OPIN-
IONS THAT SUBSTANT IAL RATE INCREASES OVER THOSE CHARGED IN 1940 ARE NOT 
NECESSARY· THE NEED OF THE COMPANY TO SECURE THESE NECESSARY UPWARD 
PRICE ADJUSTMENTS IS GREAT• HOWEVER, IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO POINT OUT 
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THAT THIS NEED TRANSCENDS THE NEED OF AN INDIVIDUAL CONCERN TO BE FINAN-
CIALLY SUCCESSFUL, BUT ASSUMES GREAT WEIGHT AND AUTHORITY AS AN INDICATOR 
OF THE FUTURE• 
B. SIGNIFICANCE QE THESE CURRENT PROBLEMS 
I • 0PERAT I ONAL 
THE COMPANY IS THE SERVICE SUPPLIER TO OVER 9G1o OF THE TELE-
PHONES IN ITS FIVE OPERATING STATES• THE REMAINING PERCENTAGE THAT IT 
DOES NOT SERVE DIRECTLY ARE BENEFITED BY THE COMPANY SINCE IT INTER-
CONNECTS ITS OWN NETWORK WITH THEIRS, AND ACTS AS AN ADVISER IN TECHN ICAL 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS FOR THE FIRMS OPERATING THEM• SUCH COVERAGE 
OF THESE FIVE STATES GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATES THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH THE 
COMPANY PLAYS IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF THE AREA IT SERVES• 
THIS ROLE REQUIRES THE COMPANY TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE UPON ITS SERVICES IN 
THE FUTURE AS IN THE PAST• ONLY A FINANCIALLY SOUND CONCERN CAN CREDIT-
ABLY DISCHARGE THIS DUTY OVER PROTRACTED PERIODS• 
fN THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL HEALTH AND WELrARE, THE COMPANY IN-
TER-CONNECTS WITH OTHER BELL SYSTEM CONCERNS TO PROVIDE OUR NATION's COM-
MUNICAT ION NETWORK• WH ILE THE COMPANY TODAY IS ABLE TO ACQUIT ITSELF 
QUITE SATISFACTORILY IN THIS ROLE, THE ECONOMIC DECISIONS OF TODAY WILL 
PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE QUALITY OF PERFORMANCE IN THE FUTURE• 
2 • REGULATION 
RECENT UTILITY COMMISSION DECISIONS INDICATE A REGULATORY AT-
TITUDE TOO INT ENT UPON KEEPING THE PRICES OF THE COMPANY'S SERVICES LOW• 
SucH AN ATTITUDE NEGLECTS THAT T0DAY 1 S COSTS OF PROVIDING TELEPHONE SER-
6 
VICE ARE BASED UPON COMPETITIVE BIDDING ~OR EMPLOYEES, MATERIALS, AND 
INVESTMENT FUNDS WITH OTHER FIRMS HAVING UNREGULATED PRICE POLICIES• 
SHOULD THIS ATTITUDE PERMEATE INTO THEIR DECISIONS REGARDING 
WHAT EARNING POWER IS NECESSARY FOR OTHER REGULATED FIRMS, UTILITIES AS 
A CLASS OF INDUSTRY WOULD FAIL TO MAINTAIN THEIR PROPER RELATIVE POSI-
TION IN THE NATION'S ECONOMY· IT IS ALSO APPROPRIATE TO MENTION THAT 
REGULATION IS BURDENED WITH THE TASK OF PROVING THAT IT HAS NOT BECOME 
A MERE POLITICAL MECHANISM• UTILITY REGULATION AND POLITICS MUST BE 
DIVORCED SINCE EQUITABLE UTILITY REGULATION MAY NOT BE DESIRABLE POL-
ITICAL ACTION IN THE NEVER-ENDING PURSUIT OF VOTES• 
C. WORK .QE. OTHERS 
SINCE THIS PROBLEM IS OF SUCH RECENT ORIGIN, LITTLE CAN BE 
FOUND THAT IS DONE BY OTHERS· COMMISSIONS AND THE COMPANY HAVE DONE 
EXTENSIVE WORK ON THIS PROBLEM• THE RESULTS OF THEIR EFFORTS HAVE 
CREATED TWO OPPOSING POSITIONS• THE ULTIMATE RESOLVING OF THIS PROBLEM 
WILL BE DEC IDED AFTER JUDICIAL REV IEW• 
TEXTS WRITTEN BY BARNES, TROXEL, BRYANT, HERMANN, AND CLEMENS 
HAVE WRITTEN EXTENSIVELY ON PUBLIC UTILITIES· THEIR WORKS HAVE NEVER 
BEEN DEVOTED TO A SINGLE ISSUE, BUT RATHER TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF UTI L-
ITY REGULATION. 
D. METHOD OF APPROACH 
THE PROBLEM, AS HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY STATED, IS THE LACK OF 
7 
AGREEMENT BETVIEEN THE COIII! PANY AND THEIR REGULATORS AS TO WHAT ARE PROPER 
EARN INGS FOR THE COMPANY. THIS PAPER DOES NOT EMBARK UPON AN INDEPE ND-
END RESEARCH TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THESE EARNINGS SHOULD BE• RATHER, IT 
CONCERNS ITSELF WITH THE DATA AND REASONINGS AS USED BY THE COMPANY AND 
THE IR REGULATORS THAT LEAD TO THEIR ULTIMATE DISAGREEMENT• ONLY IN THIS 
WAY CAN THE COMPLETE PRESENTATION OF THE COMPANY'S PROBLEM BE MADE SINCE 
THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF 11 QUAL I TV OF REGULAT I ON11 AS WELL AS 11 RESUL T S OF REG-
ULATION" • 
THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS PRESENT IN SEQUENCE THE METHODICAL PRO-
CESS THAT LEADS TO THE ASCERTAINMENT OF PROPER EARNINGS• AREAS OF DIS-
AGREEMENT ALONG THIS PROCEDURAL PATH WILL BE PRESENTED WI TH THE REASON-
INGS LEADING TO THE DISAGREEMENTS• AN EVALUATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE 
CONTENT IONS WILL BE MADE UPON THE BASIS THAT THE COMPANY IS A BUSINESS 
ENTITY AND NOT A DEVICE UPON WH IC H ECONOM IC EXPERIMENTS SHOULD BE UNDER-
T AKEN• 
8 
II VALUE OF PROPERTY 
A. Ir s RoLE IN HI STORY AND 
UsE FOR THE PRESENT 
HI STORY REVEALS THAT THE PROPERTY VALUAT I ON PHASE OF THE REG-
ULATOR Y PROCESS HAS BEEN A MAJOR I MPED IMENT I N THE PURSU IT OF ORDERLY 
AND EQUITABLE UT IL ITY REGULAT ION• LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CO NTROVERS IES OVER 
THE ISSUE EXTEND FROM TH E MET HOD OF DETERM I Nl NG THE VALU AT I ON TO THE 
CHALLENG I NG OF IT S IMPORTANCE TO THE TOTAL PR OBLEM• THESE CONTR OVERSIE S 
HAVE RESULTED IN LE NGTH Y AND COSTLY PROCEEDING S BEFORE CASES BECOME UL-
T I MATEL Y AD JUDI CATED • 
THE TERM "RATE BASE" HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AS BEING DESCRIPTIVE 
OF THE VALUATION ROLE, SINCE IT HAS TREMENDOUS IMPACT UPON UTILITY RATE 
STRUCTURE• THIS IMPACT RESULTS FROM THE VALUATION, ONCE DETERMINED, BE-
lNG MULTIPLIED BY WHAT IS CONSIDERED A FAIR RATE OF RETURN, THEIR PRODUCT 
BEING THE AMOUNT OF EARNI NGS CONSIDERED REASONABLE FOR A UTILITY TO EX-
PERIENCE• HENCE, IT IS FELT TO BE THE BASE FROM WHENC E RATES SPRING• 
FOR THIS THESIS, THE VALUE OF THE COMPANY's PROPERTY WILL BE 
THAT AMOUNT OF MONEY AS REPRESENTED BY ITS DEBT, CAPITAL STOCK AND SuR-
PLUS• "PRUDENT INVESTMENT" AND "ORIGINAL COST" ARE TERMS CONSIDERED DES-
CRIPTIVE OF SUCH A VALUATION PROCEDURE· * SOCH AN APPROACH HAS FOR AN 
HYPOTHESIS THAT PROPERTY VALUES DEFY DETERMINATION WHEN ATTEMPTS ARE MADE 
TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO PRICE CHANGES SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATES OF ACQUISITION. 
* 4 Po 299 
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HENCE THIS "PRUDENT INVESTMENT" VALUE, WHEN MULTIPLIED BY THE "CURRENT 
COST OF CAPITAL" IS FELT TO LEAD MORE EFFICIENTLY TO THE JUST AND REASON-
ABLE EARNINGS FOR A UTILITY IN QUESTION. 
THIS VALUATION DEVICE HAS BEEN SELECTED SINCE ITS AMOUNT IS 
READILY DETERMINED; IS RECOGNIZED BY ALL PARTIES TO REGULATION AS A 
PRACTICAL DEVICE, COUPLED WITH THE BELIEF THAT ANY PROCEDURE COULD BE USED 
SO LONG AS IT EFFECTS THE EARNINGS NECESSARY TO CARRY ON THE BUSINESS• 
IT IS APPROPRIATE, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS THE TWO OTHER VALUATION 
DOCTRINES THAT HAVE BEEN USED• THIS DISCUSSION WILL ILLUSTRATE THE IM-
PRACTICALITIES OF THIS THESIS ADOPTING THESE ALTERNATIVE CHOICES. THEIR 
PRESENTATION WILL BE IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY APPEARED IN INFLUENCE, 
CONCLUDING WITH THE METHOD SELECTED - "PRUDENT INVESTMENT•" 
8. THE THREE VALUATION METHODS 
I• FAIR VALUE DOCTRINE 
WHEN THE UTILITY CONCEPT WAS RELATIVELY NEW, THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CASE OF SMYTH VS AMES, SET FORTH VALUATION 
CRITERIA WHICH WAS LABELLED LATER AS THE "FAIR VALUE DOCTRINE"• As A 
WORKABLE DEVICE, IT WAS VAGUE AND ELU S IVE, AS IS APPARENT FROM THE FOLLOW-
lNG QUOTATION FROM THE DECISION: 
"WE HOLD, HOWEVER, THAT THE BAS IS OF ALL CALCULA-
TIONS AS TO THE REASONABLENESS OF RATES TO BE CHARGED BY 
A CORPORATION •••• MUST BE THE FAIR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY 
BEING USED BY IT FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE PUBLIC• AND, 
IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THAT VALUE, THE ORIGINAL COST OF 
CONSTRUCTION, THE AMOUNT AND MARKET VALUE OF ITS BONDS 
AND STOCKS, THE PRESENT AS WELL AS THE ORIGINAL COST OF 
CONSTRUCTION, PROBABLE EARNING CAPACITY OF THE PROPERTY 
UNDER PARTICULAR RATES PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE, AND THE 
tO 
SUM REQUIRED TO MEET OPERATING EXPENSES, ARE ALL MATTERS 
TO BE GIVEN SUCH WEIGHT AS MAY BE JUST AND RIGHT IN EACH 
CASE· WE DO NOT SAY THAT THERE MAY NOT BE OTHER MATTERS 
TO BE REGARDED IN ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
WHAT THE COMPANY IS TO ASK IS A FAIR RETURN UPON THE 
VALUE OF THAT WHICH IT EMPLOYS FOR THE PUBLIC CONVEN-
IENCE• ON THE OTHER HAND, WHAT THE PUBLIC IS ENTITLED 
TO DEMAND IS THAT NO MORE BE EXACTED FRa~ IT •••• THAN 
THE SERVICES RENDERED • • • • ARE REASONABLY WORTH •" * 
IT IS VAGUE IN THE RESPECT THAT IT ESTABLISHED TWO METHODS 
OF DETERMINING PROPERTY VALUE, ORIGINAL COST OR REPRODUCTION COST, WITH 
MANY INFLUENCING FACTORS ON EACH OR BOTH. ITS ELUSIVENESS SPRINGS FROM 
THE OMISSION OF WHAT ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL FACTORS CONTROL THE SELECTION 
OF ONE TO THE NEGLECT OF THE OTHER• 
IN OPERATION, THEREFORE, THIS CONCEPT WAS BURDENSOME AND 
FRUSTRATING TO COURTS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMPANIES· COMMISSIONS INVARI-
ABLY CHOSE THE VALUATION METHOD RESULTING IN THE LOWEST VALUATION. 
COMPANIES WERE CHOOSING THE METHOD LEADING TO THE HIGHEST VALUATION. 
COURTS WERE THE RESULTANT ADJUDICATORS, AND THEY USED BOTH METHODS AT 
ONE TIME OR ANOTHER· 
HOWEVER, WITH THE UTILITY CONCEPT RELATIVELY NE W AND OPERAT-
lNG IN AN ECONOMIC ENVIRONM~NT THAT WAS SIMILARLY UNKNOWN, THE ESTABLISH-
MENT OF STRICT ECONOMIC DOCTRINES BASED ON SUCH A LIMITED PERSPECTIVE 
WOULD HAVE BEEN HAZARDOUS• THE COURT INSTEAD STIPULATED THAT REGULATION 
WOULD HAVE TO BE ON A BROAD BASE• 
THIS CASE ALSO MARKED THE END OF LEGISLATIVE SUPERVISION OF' 
UTILITIES• THE MECHANICS AND MOTIVATION OF POLITICAL BODIES WERE NOT 
* 2 Po 387 
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ADAPTABLE TO UTILITY REGULATION• PRESSURES ON LEGISLATURES BY THE VOTERS, 
THE VULNERABILITY OF UTILITIES TO POLITICAL ACTION, WERE DEEMED DANGEROUS 
TO OUR CONSTITUTIONAL ~UARANTEE OF PRESERVATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. 
THEREFORE, IN THE WAKE OF SMYTH VS AMES, CAME JUDICIAL SUPERVISION. 
"THE IDEA THAT ANY LEGISLATURE, STATE OR FEDERAL, 
CAN CONCLUSIVELY DETERMINE FOR THE PEOPLE AND FOR THE 
COURTS THAT WHAT IT ENACTS IN THE FORM OF LAW, OR WHAT 
IT AUTHORIZES ITS AGENTS TO DO, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW, IS OPPOSITION TO THE THEORY OF OUR IN-
STITUTIONS• THE DUTY RESTS UPON ALL COURTS, FEDERAL 
AND STATE •••• THE PERPETUITY OF OUR INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE LIBERTY WHICH IS ENJOYED UNDER THEM DEPEND, IN NO 
SMALL DEGREE, UPON THE POWER GIVEN THE JUDICIARY TO DE-
CLARE NULL AND VOID ALL LEGISLATION THAT IS CLEARLY RE-
PUGNANT TO THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND•" * 
HOWEVER, THE CONFUSION RESULTING FROM THE DOCTRINE, AS TO ONE 
VALUATION METHOD BEING CONSIDERED MORE APPROPRIATE THAN THE OTHER, WAS 
CLARIFIED SOMEWHAT BY A CASE THAT STIPULATED REPRODUCTION COST AS BEING 
THE SOUNDER ECONOMIC APPROACH• 
2. REPRODUCTION CosT 
IN 1923, THE SuPREME COURT HANDED DOWN TWO DECISIONS CONTAIN-
lNG IN EACH PREPONDERANT WEIGHT OF REPRODUCTION COST• IN ONE OF THEM, 
THE SOUTHWESTERN BELL CASE, THE COURT SET FORTH THE REASONS WHY THEY CON-
TEMPLATED THIS APPROACH TO BE THE MORE EQUITABLE: 
"IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN WHAT WILL AMOUNT 
TO A FAIR RETURN UPON PROPERTIES DEVOTED TO PUBLIC SER-
VICE WITHOUT GIVING CONSIDERATION TO THE COST OF LABOR, 
SUPPLIES, ETC· AT THE TIME THE INVESTIGATION IS MADE• 
AN HONEST AND INTELLIGENT FOREC&ST OF PROBABLE FUTURE 
* 2 p. 387 
VALUES, MADE UPON A VIEW OF ALL RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES 
IS ESSENTIAL • • • • EST I MATES FOR TOMORROW CANNOT IGNORE 
PRICES Of' TODAY•" * 
VALUE WAS NOW THE AMOUNT WHICH IT WOULD COST TO REPLACE EX-
ISTING PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF THE INVESTIGATION. PROPERTY APPRAISALS, 
PRESENT PRICES OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES TO BUILD THE PROPERTY, ESTIMATES 
OF FUTURE PRICES OF THESE SAME PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, THE APPLICATION OF 
INDICES TO PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED VALUES, WERE ALL DEVICES USED TO DERIVE 
A VALUE THAT WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVE FOR BOTH PRESENT AND FUTURE• 
THIS VALUE, AFTER BEING LESSENED BY THE DEPRECIATION RESERVE, 
WOULD BE MULTIPLIED BY A RATE OF RETURN CONSIDERED TO BE ADEQUATE ON THE 
BASIS OF RISK CHARACTERISTICS• THE PRODUCT WOULD BE THE EARNINGS CONSID-
ERED REASONABLE• 
HOWEVER, THE ABILITY OF THIS APPROACH TO SPEED UP REGULATORY 
ACTION WAS LACKING• COMMISSIONS AND COMPANIES WERE NOW IN DISPUTE OVER 
WHAT IT WOULD COST TO REPRODUCE THE PROPERTY • WHEN 11 SPOT" PRICES OF' 
PRODUCTS WERE US ED, DISAGREEMENT EXISTED AS TO THE PROPER "SPOT"• EST!-
MATES OF FUTURE PRICES BECAME ENTANGLED IN THE PROJECT OF PREDICTING THE 
UNPREDICTABLE• I NDICES WERE OPPOSED ON THE BASIS THAT THE ONES SELECTED 
WERE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF PROPERTY VALUE• JUDICIAL SETTLEMENTS OF THESE 
CASES WERE COMING YEARS AFTER THE COMPUTATION OF THE CONTESTED VALUATIONS• 
AT THAT TIME, NEITHER VALUATION WOULD BE APT TO BE CORRECT DUE TO SUBSE-
QUENT ECONOMIC CHANGES PREDICTED BY NEITHER• 
IN AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A SATISFACTORY PROCEDURE TO REGULA-
TION, ORIGINAL COST WAS RE-INTRODUCED• 
* 2 p. 295 
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3• ORIGINAL COST OR PRUDENT INVESTMENT 
THE los ANGELES GAS & ELECTRIC Co. CASE, DECIDED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT IN 1933, IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE TURNING POINT BACK TO ORIGI NAL COST• 
THE CALIFORNIA UTILITY COMMISSION, IN THEIR BRIEF, STATED THEIR VALUATION 
WAS BASED ON ORIGINAL COsT, EVEN THOUGH THE COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN-
SISTENT UPON THE USE OF REPRODUCTION COST· THE COURT SIDE-STEPPED THE 
VALUATION ISSUE WITH THE FOLLOWING LOGIS: 
"THE LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION IMPLIED IN 
THE RATE-MAKING POWER NECESSARILY EXTENDS TO THE 
ENTIRE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, EMBRACING THE METHOD 
USED IN REACHING THE LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATlQN AS 
WELL AS THAT DETERMINATION ITSELF •••• lTHE_/ QUES-
TION IS WHETHER TH E RATES FIXED ARE CONFISCATORY· 
AND UPON THAT QUESTION THE COMPLjiNANT HAS THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE COURT MAY NOT INTERFERE 
WITH THE EXERCISE OF THE STATES' AUTHORITY UNLESS 
CONFISCATION IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED•" * 
THIS CASE, THEREFORE, RELEGATED THE QUESTION OF VALUATION TO 
A MINOR ROLE• WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS WHETHER THE RATES RESULTED IN EARN-
INGS THAT WOULD PRESERVE THE CHARACTER OF THE UTILITY• 
OTHER COMMISSIONs, TAKING THEIR CUE FROM THIS CASE, ALSO BEGAN 
TO USE 11 0RIGINAL CosT"• IT WAS NOT THAT COMMISSIONS WERE IN FUNDAMENTAL 
DISPUTE WITH THE THEORY OF REPRODUCTION COST, IT WAS BECAUSE THE THEORET-
ICAL NICETIES INHERE NT IN THE APPROACH REQUIRED OBTAINING LARGE SUMS OF 
MONEY TO PROPERLY HANDLE THEM· THESE FUNDS WERE NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO 
THE STATE COMMISSIONS IN THE AMOUNT NEEDED• THIS CASE OPENED TO THEM 
THEIR AVENUE OF ESCAPE, AND THEY TOOK IT• 
* 2 p. 408 
THIS THEORY THAT THE EARNINGS REALIZED ARE ALL IMPORTANT WAS 
STRENGTHENED IN 1942. IN THAT YEAR, THE NATURAL GAS CASE AND THE HOPE 
NATURAL GAS CASE WERE DECIDED• BOTH INFERRED THAT THE VALUATION DEVICE 
WAS UNIMPORTANT• THE COURT, IN THE HOPE NATURAL GAS CASE, STATED: 
"IT IS NOT THE THEORY, BUT THE IMPACT OF 
THE RATE ORDER WHICH COUNTS• lr THE TOTAL EFFECT 
OF THE RATE ORDER CANNOT BE SAID TO BE UNJUST AND 
UNREASONABLE, JUDICIAL INQUIRY UNDER THE ACT IS 
AT AN END• THE FACT THAT THE METHOD EMPLOYED TO 
REACH THAT RESULT MAY CONTAIN INFIRMITIES IS NOT 
THEN IMPORTANT •••• FROM THE INVESTOR OR COMPANY 
POINT OF VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE ENOUGH 
REVENUE NOT ONLY FOR OPERATING EXPENSES BUT ALSO 
FOR THE C!PITAL COSTS OF THE BUSINESS• THESE IN-
CLUDE SERVICE ON THE DEBT AND DIVIDENDS ON THE 
STOCK •••• THAT RETURN, MOREOVER, SHOULD BE SUFF-
ICIENT TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN THE FINANCIAL IN-
TEGRITY OF THE ENTERPRISE, SO AS TO MAINTAIN ITS 
CREDIT AND ATTRACT CAPITAL•" * 
THIS TRACING OF VALUATION THROUGH HISTORY LEADS US TO THE CON-
CLUSION THAT WHAT IS ARRIVED AT FOR VALUE IS SECONDARY TO THE RESULT IT 
GIVES• THE FAIRNESS OF THE RESULT IS MEASURED BY THE COMPANY'S ABILITY 
TO CONTINUE TO ATTRACT INVESTORS• IN OTHER WORDS, THE REGULATORY DECI-
SIONS AFFECTING UTILITIES WILL BE INITIALLY ADJUDICATED BY THE INVESTORS• 
THEORETICAL INSTANCES AND BRI~LIANT RHETORIC WILL NOT CAMOUFLAGE INADE-
QUATE EARNINGS WHEN MEASURED BY THESE STANDARDS• 
IT WOULD BE PRESUMPTIOUS TO BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH WILL 
DO AWAY WITH PROTESTED DECISIONS• As WAS ALWAYS THE CASE ANYWAY, THE 
SUCCESS OF THE APPROACH STILL DEPENDS UPON THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES IN-
VOLVED• COMPANIES SEEKING EXCESSIVE EARNINGS WILL BE OPPOSED· COMMISS-
* 2 p. 399 
IONS ATTEMPTING TO EFFECT LOW EARNINGS, THROUGH MISGUIDED SOCIAL ZEAL OR 
POLITICAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES, WILL BE LIKEWISE OPPOSED· VHAT THIS APPROACH 
WILL DO, OR SHOULD DO, IS SPEED UP THE PROCESS· INVESTMENT ACTION RE~CTS 
QUICKLY TO SITUATIONS ENABLING ADMINISTERED SITUATIONS TO BE QUICKLY AP-
PRAISED AS TO THEIR EFFECT• 
THIS BELIEF THAT THE PRODUCT IS CONTROLLING, AND NOT THE IN-
GREDIENTS, WAS EXPRESSED LONG BEFORE THE Los ANGELES GAS & ELECTRIC CASE, 
THE LEGAL USHER OF THIS THEORY· IN 1930, WALTER S. GIFFORD, THEN PRESI-
DENT Or THE AMERICAN COMPANY, SAID BEFORE A SENATE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE 
IN 1930: 
"So FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED IN THE TELEPHONE 
BUSINESS, SO FAR AS I AM CONCERNED IN CHARGE Or TRYING 
TO OPERATE THE BUSINESS AND GIVE TELEPHONE SERVICE, 
THESE FIGURES OF RATES OF RETURN AND ALL Or THESE LEGAL 
TERMS ARE NOT OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE EXCEPT WHEN WE 
DO NOT EARN WHAT WE NEED TO CARRY ON THE BUSINESS• THE 
THING THAT INTERESTS ME IS WHETHER WE HAVE ENOUGH MONEY 
AND ENOUGH INCOME TO CARRY ON THIS BUSINESS WHICH RE-
QUIRES HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF NEW MONEY 
EACH YEAR IF WE ARE GOING TO GO FORWARD•" * 
THE VALUE OF THE COMPANY'S PROPERTY, USING THE "ORIGINAL Cosr" 
APPROACH AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1949, IS AS FOLLOWS: 
LONG TERM DEBT 
ADvANCES 
CAPITAL STOCK 
SURPLUS 
DECEMBER 31, 1949 
TOTAL VALUATION 
$ 135,000,000 
103,300,000 
155,570, I 00 
13.255.664 
$407' 125,764 
SOURCE: COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT- DECEMBER 31, 1949 
IT IS THIS VALUATION ON WHICH A RETURN HAS TO BE MADE. THE 
RETURN NEEDED IS DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES: ONE (I)- THE RETURN ON 
DEBT; THE OTHER - THE RETURN ON EQUITY• 
THE RATE OF RETURN ON DEBT IS NEVER SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED• THE 
DEBT CONTRACT ESTABLISHES IT WITH LITTLE ROOM FOR DOUBT• HOWEVER, THE 
QUESTION IS WHAT AMOUNT SHOULD BE CONTRACTED• THE NEXT CHAPTER DIS-
CUSSES THIS PROBLEM, WITH A SUBSEQUENT CHAPTER DEALING WITH THE RATE OF 
RETURN ON EQUITY• 
I I I PRfllr:"R DEPT RAT I 0 
A. INTRODUCTION !.Q CHAPTER 
I • PRINCIPLES Of DEBT MANAGEMENT 
THIS CHAPTER WILL WE IGH THE MERITS OF THE REASONI NGS LEADING 
TO THE CONFLICTING CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHAT IS A SAFE DEBT RATIO FOR THE 
COMPANY, AS DEVELOPED BY THE COMPANY AND THE UTILITY COMMISSIO NS• THIS 
PROPORTION I S NOT DETERMINABLE BY RESORT TO MATHEMATICAL DEVICES, BUT 
RATHER IT IS A PROPORTION BASED UPON HUMAN ~UDGMENT . * THAT SUCH A UETH-
OD OF DETERMINING DEBT RATIO EXISTS, STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT IT IS THE 
VUL NERABILITY OF THE COMPANY's BUSINE SS TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE THAT CON-
TROLS DEBT LEVELS• S INCE THE BUSINESS CYCLE IS AFFECTED BY SO MANY 
DIFFERE NT FORCES, THE TYPES, MAGN ITUDE AND TIMES OF OCCURRENCE OF 'IIHICH 
ELUDE DETERM I NAT ION, REDUCTION OF THEM TO MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTIONS IS 
I MPOSS IBLE• IN ITS STEAD, HUMAN ~UDGMENT ANTICIPATES THE IR EFFECT , AND 
DEC IDES ACCORDINGLY• 
THE OBLIGATIONS ASS UMED WHEN DEBT IS EMPLOYED MAKES ITS USE I N-
FLUENCED BY THE BUSINESS CYCLE• THESE OBLIGATIONS ARE THE REQUIRING OF 
INTEREST PAYME NTS ON FIXED DATES AND THE ULTIMATE REPAYMENT OF THE DEBT 
ITSELF. DEFAULT OF THESE PAYMENTS COULD WORK SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE SER-
VICE PRODUCED , THE EQUITY HOLDERS, AND EVEN TO THE HOLDERS OF THE DEBT• 
THEREFORE, DEBT MUST NOT BE CONTRACTED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE FUNDS WITH 
* 12 p. 53 
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WH ICH TO MEET THESE FIXED PAYMENTS MA Y NOT BE RECOVERABLE FROM RE VENUE S 
DURING A REASONABLY ANTICIPATED DEPRESSED BUSINESS PER I OD. 
2. S I TUAT ION IMPELLING CHANGE 
SINCE TH E END OF WORLD WAR I I, AS HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY MENTION-
ED, THE COMPANY HAD TO EXPAND IT S PLANT TREMENDOUSLY• TH E FUNDS TO F IN-
ANCE THIs EXPANS ION WERE IN THE FORM OF ADVANCES FROM THE AMERICAN COM-
PANY• THESE ADVANCES ARE IN A FORM OF DEBT, AND ~HE EFFECT THESE ADVANCES 
HAS HAD UPON THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING COMP ARISON 
OF ITS CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON DECEMBER 31, 1945 AND DECEMBER 31, 1949: 
LONG TERM DEBT 
ADVANCES 
TOTAL LEB T 
COMMON SrocK 
SuRPLUS 
TOTAL Eounv 
TOTAL CAPITAL 
SouRcE: 
TABLE IV 
CHANGE I N COMPANYiS CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
1945 TO 1949 
DECEMBER 31, 1945 DECEMBER 
AMOUNT flw.Q AMOUNT 
95,000,000 36.2% 135,ooo,ooo 
- - - - - 0 103 ,300,000 
95,000,000 36.2% 238 ,300, 000 
155,570, I 00 59·3% 155,570,100 
I I , 667,386 4.5 13,255,664 
167,237,486 63.8% 168,825 , 764 
31, t949 
llAL1l2 
33·2% 
25-3 
58-5% 
38.2fo 
3·3 
41 ·5% 
262,237,486 ' oo.fo 407, I 25, 7 64 aoo.fo 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF COMPANY - 1945 AND 1949. 
BOTH THE COMMISS I ONS AND THE COMPA NY AGREE THAT THE PRESENT 
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LEVEL OF DEBT IS TOO HIGH• DISAGREEMENT EXISTS AS TO WHAT LEVEL OF DEBT 
IS SAFE AND PROPER• THE COMPANY HAS ESTABLISHED AS THEIR I MMED I ATE OB-
JECTIVE A LONG TERM DEBT RATIO OF 35fo, WHIL E THE COMMISSIONS HAVE DECID-
ED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 45fo DEBT RATIO IS PROPER· TH E PRESENTA-
TION OF THE TWO CONTENTIONS FOLLOWS: 
8. CONTENTION OF COMPANY SUPPORTING A 
35$ DEBT RATIO 
I• DEBT RATIO Nor A PROPER AREA OF REGULATORY ACTIVITY 
THE COMPANY ASSERTS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEBT RATIO I S A 
FUNCTION OF MANAGEMENT, NOT SUBJECT TO REGULATION• THAT REGULATION DOES 
NOT CONTEMPLATE THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE REGULATORY BELIEFS I N TH I S MATTER 
OF DEBT RAT IO, IS IMPLIED IN THE DECISION OF THE SOUTHWESTERN BELL CASE: 
"THE COMMISSION IS NOT THE FINANCIAL MANAGER 
OF THE CORPORAT ION, AND IT IS NOT EMPL WERED TO SUBSTI-
TU RE ITS .JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE CORP-
ORATION; NOR CAN IT IGNORE IT EMS CHARGED BY THE UTILITY 
AS OPERATING EXPENSES UNLESS THERE IS AN ABUSE OF DIS-
CRETION IN THAT REGARD BY THE CORPORATE OFF IC ERS•" * 
THAT THE DETERMINATION OF DEBT RATIO SHOULD BE A REGULATORY 
RIGHT, SHOULD RA ISE THE QUESTION AS TO WHERE MANAGEMENT ENDS AND REGULA-
TION BEGINS• WITH THIS NEW WEDGE I NTO AFFAIRS OF MANAGMENT, REGULATORS 
IN THE FUTURE MAY WELL USURP MORE MANAGEMENT FUNCT IONS, BUT ALL THE WH IL E 
NOT ASSUME THE RESPONS IBIL I TIES Ot MANAGEMENT. HOWEVER, TH IS IS A LEGAL 
ISSUE, THE DEBATE OF WH IC H WILL NOT THROW LIGHT ON THE PROPR I ETY OF WHAT 
DEBT LEVEL IS ECONOMICALLY SOUND. 
* 13 p. 94 
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2. ECONOMICS Su PPORTING COMPANY•s CONTENTION 
THE ECONOMICS OF WHAT CONST ITUTES A PROPER LONG TE RM DEBT RAT IO 
IS AN ISSUE BEST EXPLORED BY E XAM INING THE VULNERAB ILITY OF THE COMPA NY1 S 
BUSI NE SS TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE• THESE ECONOMI C CR I TER I A LEADING TO THE 
CONCLUSION DECREEING THE 3Sfo LONG TE RM DEBT RATIO FOLLOW. 
TH E INITIAL STEP IN THIS PROCESS I S TO ESTABLI SH SOME STANDARD 
FOR COMP ARIS ON • T HE ELECT R IC UTILITY F IELD I S AN EXC ELL ENT STA NDARD SINC E 
IT POSSESSES THE RIGHTS OF EXCL USIVE FRANCHISE, IS AN I NDUSTRY REQU IRI NG 
HUGE I NV ESTMENT FUNDS, AND IN THE SHORT RUN IS RELAT IVELY FREE OF COMPE-
TITION FROM OTHER SERVICES• IT IS TRUE THAT COMPE TITION AND LIKELIHOOD 
OF SUBSTITUTION EX IST IN THE LO NG RUN, BU T THE PROBLEM AT THE START OF A 
RECESS IO N IS HOW TO SURVIV E THE IMMEDIATE SHORT RUN• THEREFORE, I T MA Y BE 
ASSUMED THAT I N THE SHORT RUN, ELECTR IC UTILITIES ARE A COMPLETE MONOPOLY 
WITH NO CO.VIPET ITION, AS IS TH E TELE PHONE I NDUSTRY • THE NEXT STEP I S TO 
COMP ARE A DOWNWARD TURN I N THE BUSINESS CYCLE• 
TH E DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY IS MUCH MORE STABLE THAN THE DEMAND 
FOR TELEPHONE SERVICE • CHART No . I ANALYZE S THIS INSTAB ILITY BY REFER-
ENCE TO THE NUMBER OF CUSTOM ERS OVER A PER I OD OF YEARS• ASSUM ING 1930 TO 
HAVE AN I NDEX VAL UE OF tOO , THE NUMBER OF CUSTOMER S FOR EL ECTRICITY DECLI N-
ED BUT 2.2j1, FROM 1930- 1933• I N THE SAME PER IOD, TELEPHONE CUS TOMERS 
DROPPED 17 •l fo • THIS NA TURALLY MEANS THAT "IDL E PLANT" IN THE TELEPHONE I N-
DUSTR Y WI LL INCREAS E MUCH MORE THAN FBR EL ECTR I C UTIL I T I ES• "IDLE PLANT" 
PRODUCES NO REVENUE WITH WHICH TO PA Y WAG ES , BU Y MATE RIALS, PROV IDE MA I N-
TENANCE, AND THE OT HER F I XED COSTS, OF WHICH DEBT I NTEREST IS ONE • 
T HAT THE REVENUE OF THE TELEPHONE I NDUSTRY DID DECREASE MORE THAN 
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THAT OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES IS SHOWN IN CHART No. I I• STILL ASSUMING 1930 
TO REPR ESENT 100, ELEC TR IC REVEN UES FROM J930 - 1933 DECREASED I l•9fo, BUT 
TELEPHbNE REVENUES PLUMMETED 20.~fo• WIT H BOTH INDUSTR I ES BE ING OF THE 
HIGH F IXED COST NATURE, IT IS READILY SEEN THAT THE SQUEEZE UPON THE TEL-
EPHONE INDUSTRY WAS RE LAT IVELY MORE SEVERE• 
So THEN, HERE ARE TWO COMPARABLE UTILITIES, BUT ONE POSSESSING 
A MORE STABLE DEMAND FOR ITS SERVICE WHEN COMPARED WITH THE OTHER • BOTH 
OF THESE UTILITIES EMPLOY DEB T CAPITAL• KEEP I NG IN MIND THE MORE STABLE 
NATURE OF ELECTRICITY DEMAND, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THE EXTENT TO 
WHICH EACH HAS EMPLOYED IT• 
CHART No . I I I PORTRAYS THE ELECT RIC UTILITI ES AS CA RRY ING AN 
AVERAGE DEBT RATIO OF ABOUT 451.· REASONING SHOULD LEAD TO A CONCLUSION 
THAT THE BELL SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE A LOWER LONG TERM DEBT RATI O• THAT A 
LOWER RATIO FOR THE BELL SYSTEM DID EXIST IS SHOWN BY CHART No . IV, AVER-
AGING PRIOR TO 1945 ABOUT 33fo, AND CHART No. V PORTRAYS THE COMPANY CARRY-
ING A LONG TERM DEBT RATIO OF APPROXIMATELY 37%• 
ATTEMPTS TO PREDICT FUTURE AMPLITUDES OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ··IS 
A RATHER HOPELESS TASK• HOWEVER, IT IS TO BE REASONABLY EXPECTED THAT 
CHANGES IN ITS DIRECTION WILL OCCUR· IN THE ABSENCE OF KNOWING WHAT THE 
FUTURE WILL BE, NO FINANCIAL STRUCTURE SHOULD BE ADOPTED THAT COULD NOT 
COPE WITH A REPETITION OF HISTORY· THEREFORE, THE PROPRIETY OF ESTAB-
LISHING A LONG TERM DEBT RATIO ABOVE THE PROVEN SAFE LEVEL OF 351o IS TO 
BE SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED• 
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2. 
2. 7. 
3• OPINIONS OF OTHERS OuTSIDE OF COMPANY 
THE COMPANY HAS HAD LEADING MEN IN THE FIELD OF CORPORATE FIN-
ANCE TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF THE 351o LONG TERM DEBT RATIO• THESE MEN HAVE 
EXPRESSED THEMSELVES ON THIS MATTEA AS FOLLOws: 
JOHN G. fLINT, PARTNER IN KIDDE R, PEABODY & Co., INVESTMENT 
BA NKERS, STATEs: 
"IN MY OPINION, THE APPROPRIATE DEBT RATIO FOR THE 
COMPANY SHOULD RANGE FROM ABOUT 3ofo TO 35.1a OF THE 
TOTAL CAPITALIZATION."* 
GEORGE M. SHA NN ON, LOOMIS SAYLES & Co ., INVESTMENT COUNSELS, 
TESTIFIED: 
"IN MY OPINION, I WOULD SET, AS AN IMMEDIATE OB-
JECTIVE FOR THE COMPANY, A REDUCT I ON IN ITS DEBT 
TO ABOUT 35.1a OF CAPITALIZATION." * * 
DR. HERBERT B. DORAU, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT NEw YORK UNIV-
ERSITY, A RECOGNIZED EXPERT ON UTILITY FINANCE, EXPLAINED THAT: 
"THE DEBT RATIO OUGHT TO BE KEPT WITHIN A SAFE MAR-
GIN• A MARGIN OF 35% FOR THE COMPANY, IF IT CAN 
BE HANDLED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE COMPANY CAN GET 
BACK TO THAT 35% AND CAN HAVE A RESERVE BORROWING 
CAPACITY BEYOND THAT, THEN IT IS IN A POSITION TO 
GET A FAIR RETURN. A HIGH DEBT RATIO AT THE PEAK 
OF THE ECONOMIC CYCLE IS A HAZARD TO THE FINANCIAL 
FUTURE OF AN ENTERPRISE IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS 
DECLINE• 11 *** 
LEE P. STAcK, VIcE-PRESIDENT or JoHN HANCOCK MuTUAL LIFE INsuR-
ANCE Co., IN CHARGE OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENTS, STAT ED AS HIS 
OPINION: 
* 13 p. 29 
* * 13 p. 44 
"THE NEW ENGLAND COMPANY SHOULD, IN MY OPINION, AS 
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BRING ITS DEBT DOWN TO AROUND 
35%, BECAUSE ANYTHING ABOVE THAT RAISES THE QUES-
TION OF SAFETY IN THE MINDS OF INVESTORS." **** 
*** 13 p. 101 
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C. CONTENTIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSIONS 
IN SUPPORT Or A 42% DEBT RATIO 
I. GENERAL APPROACH Or COMMISSIONS 
THE REASONINGS LEADING TO THE UTILITY COMMISSIONS DECIDING UPON 
A 45% LONG TERM DEBT RATI O NEGLECTS ANY REFERENCE TO THE BUSINESS CYCLE• 
INSTEAD, THEY APPROACHED THE PROBLEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT THAT A 35% RATIO 
IS MORE EXPENSIVE TO THE CUSTOMER THAN IS A 45% RATIo, AND HENCE IS UN-
FAIR TO THE CUSTOMER· * 
2. COMMISSION ARGUMENTS JN SUPPORT OF THEIR GENERAL APPROACH 
THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION WAS GREATLY I NFLUENCED BY THE 
LARGE QUANTITIES OF DEBT MONEY THAT WAS AVAILABLE• ** SINCE DEBT IS 
CHEAPER THAN EQUITY, THEY QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF LEAVING THESE FUNDS 
UNTAPPED• THIS REASONING OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT IF DEBT WAS NOT CHEAP-
ER THAN EQUITY IT WOULD NEVER EXIST IN THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
COMPANY OR ANY CONCERN• As TO THE LIBERAL QUANTITIES OF DEBT MONEY AVAIL-
ABLE, THE COMPANY MAINTAINS THAT DEBT, LIKE WHISKEY, SHOULD BE CONSUMED 
NOT ON THE BASIS OF ITS PRICE OR AVAILABILITY, BUT ON THE BASIS OF WHAT 
EFFECT ITS USE HAS• *** 
COMMISSIONS NOTED THAT DEBT INTEREST IS A DEDUCTION BEFORE TAXES, 
AND HENCE REASONED THAT A DOLLAR OF DEBT INTEREST REQUIRED BUT A DOLLAR 
Or REVENUE WHILE A DOLLAR OF EQUITY PAYMENTS, DUE TO THE TAX LAWS, RE-
QUIRED MORE THAN A DOLLAR OF REVENUE• THESE REASONS ARE BUT THE MECHAN-
ICS Or WHY DEBT IS CHEAPER THAN EQUITY, A FACT NEVER IN DISPUTE. THEY DO 
NOT DETERMINE TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE USED• 
* 
** 
*** 
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IN MASSACHUSETTS A FRANCHISE TAX EXISTS ON THE CAPITAL STOCK OF 
CORPORATIONS• THE TAX THAT THE COMPANY WOULD BE LIABLE FOR UNDER THIS 
TAX LAW IS CONTROLLED IN PART BY THE MARKET VALUE OF THE STOCK. SINCE 
THE MARKET VALUE NECESSARY TO EFFECT A 35fo DEBT RATIO WOULD RENDER THE 
COMPANY LIABLE TO A TAX OF NEARLY $5,000,000, A COST BORNE BY THE CUS-
TOMER, THE COMMISSION DECIDED TO BURDEN THE CUST~AER WITH THIS TAX WOULD 
BE UNFAIR TO THESE CUSTOMERS. * 
IT WOULD APPEAR LIKELY THAT THE INTENT OF THIS FRANCHISE TAX 
IS TO OBTAIN FUNDS FOR THE STATE WITH WHICH TO DEFRAY THE COSTS OF GOV-
ER NMENT• IF THE COMMISSION FEELS THAT THE LAW IN ITS PRESENT FORM WOULD 
TAX TELEPHONE CUSTOMERS DISPROPORTIONATELY WITH OTHE R AREAS OF TAXATION, 
THE PROPER AIM OF THEIR REGULATORY ACTIVITY SHOULD BE TOWARDS SECURING 
REPEAL OR AN AMENDMENT OF THE LAW• THE COMPANY SUMMARIZES THE ATTITUDE 
OF THE COMMISSION IN THIS MATTER AS COMPARABLE TO THE BELIEF THAT "ALL 
TAXES ON OR RELATED TO NET EARNINGS COULD BE AVOIDED BY THE ELIMINATION 
OF SUCH EARNINGS•" ** 
D. CONCLUS! ON 
I• 35% DEBT RATIO REQUIRED 
AFTER PRESENTING THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE 35% LONG TERM 
DEBT RATIO FOR THE COMPANY AND THOSE IN FAVOR OF A RATIO OF 45fo, THE CON-
CLUSION IS THAT THE DEBT LEVEL FOR THE COMPANY IS SAFE AND PROPER WHEN AT 
THE FORMER LEVEL• THE REASON FOR THIS CONCLUSION IS THAT THE COLLECTIVE 
30 
OPINIONS OF COMPANY MANAGEMENT AND OF INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL EXPERTS, COUPLED 
* 12 p. 54 
** 13 p. 121 
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WITH THE FINANCIAL ACTIONS OF THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY SHOULD BE AL-
LOWED CO NTROLLING WEIGHT OVER OPINIONS BASED SOLELY UPON DES IRES TO KEEP 
TELEPHONE RATES LOW• 
2. EFFECT ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF 3~ DEBT RATIO 
To ACCOMPLISH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE, A 35fo LONG 
TERM DEBT RATIO IN THEIR CAPITAL STRUCTURE REQUIRES THE REFINANCING OF 
THEIR PRESENT SHORT TERM DEBT BY THE ISSUANCE OF EQUITY SECURITIES• THE 
FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS THE EXACT EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE: 
TABLE V 
EFFECT OF 35'fo DEBT RATIO ON 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF COMPANY AS OF ON DECEMBER 31, 1949 
PRESENT STRUCTURE *' NEw STRUCTURE 
(AFTER REFINANCING) 
AMOUNT B.ll.!.,Q AMOUNT RATIO 
LONG TERM DEBT 135,ooo,ooo 33·21. 142,494,000 35-f. 
ADVANCES 103,3oo,ooo &:.3. 
TOTAL DEBT 238,300,000 58.5f. 142,494,000 35-f. 
COMMON SrocK 155,570,100 38.21. 25 I , 3 7 6, I 00 61·71. 
SURPLUS 13.255,664 ..3.ii 13,255',664 _hi 
T.QT AL EouiTY 168,825,764 4~o5f. 264,631,764 65. 'fo 
TOTAL CAPITAL 407,125,764 10o.f. 407 , I 25, 7 64 IOO.f. 
* AN NUAL REPO~T OF COMPANY, DECEMBER 1949 
HOWEVER, TO ACCOMPLISH THIS REFINANCING, THE EARNINGS OF THE COM-
PA NY HAVE TO BE AT LEVELS HIGH ENOUGH TO ATTRACT INVESTORS. THE NEXT CHAPT-
ER DISCUSSES WHAT EARNINGS AFTER TAXES ARE NECE SSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS• 
IV. EARNINGS ON EQUITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 1Q CHAPTER 
I• DETERMINANT OF PROPER EQUITY EARNINGS 
UTILITY REGULATION IN OPERATION EXTENSIVELY EMPLOYS THE DEVICE 
OF MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF ITS ACTION BY DIRECT COMP,ARISON WITH PRE-
DETERMINED STANDARDS. THESE STANDARDS ARE DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE ECON-
OMIC LAWS GOVERNING OUR ECONOMY, THE ACHIEVING OF WHICH ASSURES FAIR 
TREATMENT BEING GIVEN TO ALL SEGMENTS OF THE ECONOMY· ON THE ISSUE OF 
"RATE OF RETURN" THE REGULATORY STANDARD IS "WHAT RATE OF RETURN ATTRACTS 
CAPITAL", POPULARLY TERMED THE "CURRENT COST OF CAPITAL•" 
THE ESTABLISHING OF THIS AS THE STANDARD IS IN RECOGNITION OF 
THE FACT THAT IF CAPITAL IS NOT OFFERED WHAT IT CAN OBTAIN ELSEWHERE, IT 
IS NOT FORTHCOMING TO ITS SEEKER• THE APPROPRIATENESS OF "CURRENT CAPITAL 
COSTS" AS THE ONLY TERM WITH WHICH TO RECKON IS NOW NE WLY CONCEIVED• THIS 
PRINCIPLE WAS ALSO CONTROLLING IN 1923, AS IS ATTESTED TO BY THE STATEMENT 
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE BRANDEIS IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION OF THE SOUTH-
WESTERN BELL CASE: 
* 2 p. 295 
"THE NECESSARY COST • • • • OF THE MONEY EMBARKED RE-
CENTLY IN UTILITIES, AND OF THAT WHICH MAY BE IN-
VESTED IN THE NEAR FUTUR E, MAY BE MORE, AS IT MAY 
BE LESS, THAN THE PREVAILING RATE OF RETURN RE-
QUIRED TO INDUCE CAPITAL TO ENTER UPON LIKE ENTER-
PRISES AT THE TIME OF A RATE HEARING TEN YEARS 
HENCE· To FIX THE RETURN BY THE RATE WHICH 
HAPPENS TO PREVAIL AT SUCH FUTURE DAY, OPENS THE 
DOOR TO GREAT HARDSH I PS•" * 
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THIS DIRECTIVEm REGULATORY BODIES IS RECOGNIZED AS CONTROLLING 
BY THE COMMISSIONS REGULATING THE COMPANY. TYPIFYING THE PRESENT INTER-
PRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLE IS THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT MADE BY THE MASS-
ACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN THEIR FINAL REPORT OF THE 
1947 PETITION OF THE COMPANY: 
"0F COURSE IN DETERMINING THE RATE OF RETURN 
ON THE COMPANY'S CAPITAL STOCK, IT MUST BE 
FIXED NEITHER SO HIGH AS TO PLACE AN UNREA-
SONABLE BURDEN UPON THE PUBLIC, NOR SO LOW 
AS TO DISCOURAGE CAPITAL FROM VENTURING UPON 
THE ENTERPRISE• UNLESS THE RATE OF RETURN 
IS SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO ATTRACT CAPITAL, IN-
VESTORS WILL SEEK OTHER CHANNELS ATTENDED 
WITH LESS RISK, AND UTILITY PROPERTIES WILL 
BE UNABLE TO FINANCE THEIR ENTERPRISES AND 
THE PUBLIC WILL BE DEPRIVED OF THEIR SERVICES·" * 
I 
2. BASIC INFLUENCES ON COMPANY S "CURRENT COST OF CAPITAL"· 
To DETERMINE WHAT RATE OF RETURN TO BE ALLOWED THE EQUITY POR-
TION OF THE COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE THAT WILL MEET THIS STANDARD OF 
"CURRENT CAPITAL COST11 REQUIRES THE ANSWERING OF THE THREE FOLLOWING 
QUESTIONs: 
I• SHOULD "SURPLus" EARN A "RATE OF RETURN"? 
2. WHAT MUST THE MA RKET PRICE OF THE COMPANY'S 
STOCK BE BEFORE A SUCCESSFUL STOCK FLOTATION 
MAY BE UNDERTAKEN? 
3• WHAT IS THE "CURRENT COST OF CAPITAL"? 
THE FIRST QUESTION HAS TO BE ANSWERED DUE TO SOME COMMISSIONS, 
NOTABLY THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION, QUESTIONING THE ECONOMICS THAT DIC-
TATES THE INCLUSION OF SURPLUS INTO THAT TOTAL REQUIRING AN "EQUITY RETURN" 
FOR ITS USE• THE SECOND QUESTION IS LINKED WITH THE LEGAL RESTRICTION THAT 
* 12 p. 45 
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NE W STOCK OF THE COMPA NY CAN NOT BE SOLD AT A PRICE LO\VER THAN ITS PAR 
VALUE· THE THIRD QUESTION CONCERNS THE VITAL ISSUE AS TO WHAT EARNINGS 
ARE NECESSARY TO ATTRACT THE FUNDS• THE APPRAISAL OF EACH QUESTION IS 
NECESSARY TO PROPERL Y CONCLUDE AS TO WHAT EARNINGS ON EQUITY SHOULD BE, 
SINCE: 
I• EQUITY EARNINGS WILL BE AFFECTED AS 
TO TOTAL ACCORDING TO THE TREAT MENT 
ACCORDED SURPLUS. 
2. APPRAISALS BY INVESTORS ARE ASSOCIAT-
ED WITH THE PRICE THEY PAY, NOT THE 
NET PROCEEDS GOING TO THE COMPANY. 
3. UPON THE PROPER DETERMINATION OF COST 
OF EQUITY CAPITAL RESTS THE ABILITY 
OF THE COMPAN Y TO ATTRACT THE FUNDS 
NEEDED• 
8. SHOULI! "SURPLUS" EARN A "RATE .QE. RETUR"i"? 
I • SURPLUS PROVISIONS SOUND MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
THE COMPA NY IN THE PAST HAS WITHHELD FROM THEIR EARNINGS AVAIL-
ABLE FOR DIVIDENDS, AMOUNTS OF MONEY WHICH IT HAS RE-INVESTED IN ITS 
PLANT• THE SOUNDNESS OF SUCH ACTION ON THE PART OF MANAGEME NT IS OVER-
WHELMINGLY ESTABLISHED AS BEING SOUND FINANCIAL ACTION TO EFFECTIVELY COPE 
WITH FUTURE CONTINGENCIES• A REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENT REGARDING THE PRU-
DENCE OF SUCH A BUSINESS PRINCIPLE IS FOUND IN THE UNITED RAILWAYS CASE, 
WHERE PART OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION REVIEWED THE 
ROLE OF SURPLUS: 
"SOUND BUS I NESS MANAGEMENT REQUIRES THAT AF'TER 
PAYING ALL EXPENSES OF' OPERATION, SETTING ASIDE 
THE NECESSARY SUMS F'OR DEPRECIATION, PAYMENT OF' 
INTEREST AND REASONABLE DIVIDENDS, THERE SHOULD 
REMAIN SOMETHING TO PASS TO THE SURPLUS ACCOUNT; 
AND A RATE OF RETURN WHICH DOES NOT ADMIT OF' 
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THAT BEING DONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ASSURE 
CONFIDENCE IN THE FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS OF THE 
UTILITY TO MAINTAIN ITS CREDIT AND ENABLE IT 
TO RAISE MONEY NECESSARY FOR THE PROPER DIS-
CHARGE OF ITS PUBLIC DUTIES•" * 
2. SURPLUS PROVISIONS Do NOT IMPOSE EXTRA CHARGES ON CUSTOMERS 
CERTAIN UTILITY COMMISSIONS, SUCH AS MASSACHUSETTS, WHILE IN 
AGREEMENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF SURPLUS APPROPRIATIONS, DO DENY SURPLUS 
A RATE OF RETURN• THE REASONS FOR THIS ACTION STEMS FROM THEIR BELIEF 
THAT TO DO SO IS, IN EFFECT, TO CHARGE CUSTOMERS INTEREST ON THEIR OWN 
MONEY • PLAIN ECONOMIC ANALYSIs, HOWEVER, ILLUSTRATES THAT PROPER SUR-
PLUS PROVISIONS IN NO WAY RESULT IN EXTRA CHARGES BEII\IG MADE TO THE CUS-
TOMER• 
COMPANY REQUIREMENTS FOR CAPITAL FUNDS ARISE FROM THE NECESS-
lTV OF IMPROVING OR EXPANDING THEIR FACILITIES• THE OBTAINING OF THIS 
CAPITAL THROUGH SURPLUS APPROPRIATIONS IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROCESS 
OF PAYING OUT ALL EARNINGS AS DIVIDENDS, THEN SELLING STOCK TO THESE SAME 
STOCKHOLDERS, OR OTHERS, FOR THE AMOUNT REPRESENTED BY SURPLUS· FOR COM-
MISSIONS TO ALLOW A RATE OF RETURN ON THE RESULTING CAPITAL STOc~, BUT 
NOT ON SURPLUS, IS TO CLAIM A DISTINCTION NOT SUPPORTED BY LOGIC• 
IF REGULATORS SUBMIT THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION, THEN BY EN-
COURAGING THE COMPA NY TO CREATE SURPLUS ACCOUNTS ON WHICH NO RETURN WILL 
BE ALLOWED, IS TO REQUEST THE CoMPANY TO CONFISCATE THE RIGHTFUL PROPERTY 
OF INVESTORS FOR DOUBTFUL BENEFITS TO CUSTOMERS• THAT LOWER RATES COULD 
RESULT BY THESE "CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS" IS BEYOND THE REALM OF REALITY, 
SINCE SUCH "BENEVOLENCE" WOULD BE REFLECTED IN INVESTORS HENCEFORTH RE-
* t3 p. 24 
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.;:UIRING A HIGHER RATE OF RETURN TO COMPENSATE FOR THE GREATER RISKS IN-
VOLVED• 
3 • ExcLUDING SuRPLUS FROM "RATE BASE" ILLEGAL 
THAT THE MAS SACHUSETTS COMMISSION HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO 
EXCLUDE SURPLUS FROM THAT ENTITLED TO A RETURN IS OPEN TO SERIOUS DOUBT, 
IF THE CASE OF SPRINGFIELD V UNITED ELECTRIC LIGHT Co~ IS ANY CRITERIA: 
"SURPLUS EARNINGS OF' THE COMPANY PROPERLY ACQUIRED 
WHICH ARE PRUDENTLY INVESTED IN PLANT ARE ALSO IN-
CLUDED IN THE RATE BASE AND THE COMPANY IS FAIRLY 
ENTITLED TO A FAIR RETURN ON THE SURPLUS SO INVEST-
ED• SURPLUS HAS BEEN DETERMINED JUDICALLY TO BE 
THE COMPANY'S PROPERTY, THEREFORE THE COMPANY MAY 
DECLARE ITS SURPLUS AS DIVIDE NDS, BUT IF IT ELECTS 
INSTEAD TO INVEST IT IN PLANT THE CUSTOMERS ARE 
SERVED BY THAT PLANT, WHICH MAY BE FINANCED BY THE 
ISSUE OF CAPITAL STOCK• IT IS ONLY FAIR UNDER SUCH 
CIRCUMSTANCE S THAT A RETURN SHOULD BE PERMITTED AS 
WELL AS IN THE CASE OF' SURPLUS PRUDENTLY INVESTED 
IN PLANT AS IN THE CASE OF PLANT WHICH IS CAPITAL-
IZED BY THE ISSUE OF' STOCK• IN OTHER WORDS, PLANT 
ACQUIRED BY THE USE OF' SURPLUS AS PROPERLY BELONGS 
IN THE RATE BASE AS PLANT AC QUIRED WITH THE PRO-
CEEDS OF' A STOCK ISSUE•" * 
THE PRECEDING PRESENTAT ION EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE 
EXCLUSION OF SURPLUS FROM THE RAT E BASE IS UNTENABLE LOGIC• CAPITAL IS 
CAPITAL WHETHER DERIVED FROM EARNINGS OR FROM STOCK ISSUES• OPPOSITION 
TO THE CONTRARY CAN NOT BE FOUND BY RESORT TO PRINCIPLES THAT ARE COM-
PATIBLE WITH OUR OWN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
* 13 p. 139 
"To REGARD RE-INVESTED EARNINGS AS CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
THE PUBLIC, OR THE PROPERTY PAID FOR BY RE-INVESTED 
EARNINGS AS DEVELOPED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PUBLIC, 
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SEEMS OBVIOUSLY TO BE FALLACIOUS· THE PUBLIC 
PAYS IN RATES rOR A SERVICE RECEIVED· THE EARN-
INGS ARE THEN BOTH LEGALLY AND EQUITABLY THE 
PROPERTY Or THE COMPANY TO DO WITH AS THEY PLEASE• 
IF THE EARNINGS ARE DISTRIBUTED AS DIVIDENDS TO 
THE INVESTORS, THE RATE-PAYING PUBLIC CLEARLY HAS 
NO FURTHER INTEREST IN, OR CONTROL OVER, THEM. 
SI MILARLY, IF THE EARNINGS BE PUT BACK INTO THE 
PROPERTY IN THE FORM Or ADDITIONS AND BETTERMENTS, 
~HE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS CA NNOT LOGICALLY MAIN-
TAIN THAT THE PUBLIC HAS AN INTEREST IN SUCH PRo-
PERTY ANY MORE THAN IN THE ORIGINAL PROPERTY PAID 
FOR FROM THE SALE Or SECURITIES•" * 
C. WHAT MUST THE MARKET PRICE Or THE COMPANY's STOCK 
BE TO AssURE A SUCCESSFUL STOCK FLO! AT I ON? 
I• LEGAL RESTRICTIONS AND INFLUENCES OF THE GENERAL SECURITIES fV1 ARK£I 
THAT THIS FACTOR OF MARKET PRICE IS IMPORTANT TO THE TOTAL PROB-
LEM IS DUE TO THE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS FORBIDDING THE SALE OF NEW SECURITIES 
OF THE COMPANY AT A PRICE LOWER THAN ITS PAR VALUE Or $ 100. ** IT IS AN 
AC CEPTED tACT THAT THE OrrERING Or NEW SECURITIES ON THE MARKET DEPRESSES 
THE MARKET PRICE Or ITS THEN OUTSTANDING SHARES• THIS IS CAUSED BY THE 
DISRUPTING Or THE NORMAL DAY-TO-DAY BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP AS TO THE 
STOCK INVOLVED, PLUS DOUBTS BEING RAISED IN THE MINDS Or SOME INVESTORS 
AS TO THE ABILITY OF THE OrrERER TO EARN THE SAME DIVIDEND FOR BOTH THE 
OLD A~ID THE NEW• THEREFORE, THE MARKET PRICE OF THE COMPANY'S STOCK MUST 
BE HIGH ENOUGH ABOVE $ 100 TO PREVENT THESE DEPRESSING PRICE FACT ORS , BY 
THEMSELVES, DRIVING THE PRICE BELOW $ 100. 
HOWEVER, THE MARKET PRICE HAS TO BE EVEN ABOVE THAT LEVEL, DUE 
TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SECURITIES MARKET EXPERIENCING A GENERAL DECLINE 
* 13 p. t37 
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DURING THE OFFERING• IT FOLLOWS THEN, THAT THE CORRECT MARKET PRICE IS 
THAT WHICH CZN WITHSTAND NOT ONLY THE EFFECTS OF MARKET-PRESSURE, BUT AL-
SO THE EVENTUALITY OF SOME REASONABLY ANTICIPATED GENERAL MARKET DECLINE 
OC CURRING AT THE SAME TIME• To SETTLE UPON ANY OTHER VALUE IS TO REGARD 
LOOSELY THE STAKES INVOLVED• 
AN INTERESTING FACET TO THIS PROBLEM OF MARKET PRICE ARISES 
OUT OF THE ROLE "RI GHTS" HAS IN THE ISSUANCE OF THESE NEW SECURITIES• 
THE SPREAD BET WEEN SUBSCRIPTION PRICE AND MARKET PRICE MUST BE OF SUFF-
ICIENT MAGNITUDE TO AS 3 1GN TO THESE RIGHTS A VALUE THAT WILL ENCOURAGE 
EXISTING STOCKHOLDERS NOT WANTING TO SUBSCRI BE TO THE OFFERING TO SELL 
THEM TO WILLING BUYERS· SINCE RIGHTS ARE SIMPLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
SPREAD BETWEEN MARKET PRICE AND SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, A DECLINE IN THE 
MAR KET PRICE TO NEAR THAT OF SUBSCRIPTION PRICE WOULD RESULT IN THESE 
RIGHTS HAVING VERY LITTLE VALUE• IN THAT EVENT, THE LIKELIHOOD OF PRE-
SENT INVESTORS EITHER EXERCISING THEIR RI GHTS OR SELLING THEM IS LESSEN-
ED• UNDER EITHE R CASE THE SUCCESS OF THE OFFERI NG IS SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED• 
2. 20~ PROPER ALLOWANCE FOR "MARKET PRESSURE 11 
THE C~~PANY ANALYZED TWENTY-SIX RECENT STOCK OFFERINGS• THE 
AVERAGE DECLINE FROM THE EFFECTS OF MARKET-PRESSURE WAS 9.7'fo, WITH THE 
PERCENTAGE BECOMING HIGHER AS THE OFFERING RATIO INCREASED TO THAT WHICH 
WOULD BE THE OFFERING RATES OF THE COMPANY• IT WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT 
THE MARKET-PRESSURE BECAME HIGHER AS THE AMOUNT OFFERED INCREASED, SINCE 
THE "UNDERWRITTEN ISSUES OF MORE THAN $ 10,000,000 WHICH WERE SUBSCRIBED 
goj. OR BETTER HAD AN AVERAGE MARKET PRESSURE OF 12•3fo·" THE COMPANY 
CONCLUDED THAT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR HEAVY OFFERING RATIO AND THE HUGE 
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SUM INVOLVED, AN ALLOWANCE FOR MA RKET-PRESSURE SHOUL D BE AT A MINIMUM OF 
IN DETERMINI ~ G THE ALLOWANCE FOR A GENERAL MARKET DECLINE, THE 
COMPANY RELIED ON A "STUDY OF tOO CONSECUTIVE MONTHS, FROM JULY 1935 TO 
OcTOBER, 1943, WHICH INCLUDED TWO MA~OR MARKET ADVANCES AND TWO MA~OR 
DECLINES ••·• COMPUTED THE PER CENT DECLINE IN THE Dow-JONES INDUSTRIAL 
AVERAGES FROM THE BEGINNI NG OF EACH MONTH TO THE LOW OF EACH SUCCESSIVE 
TWO MONTHS' PERIOD •••• TWO MONTHS WERE USED SINCE IT USUALLY EQUALS 
THE PERIOD IN WHICH AN OFFERING IS KNOWN AND ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE •••• 
THE AVERAGE DECLINE WAS 5% •••• 5fo WOULD ONLY BE ADEQUATE IN 2 OUT OF 3 
CASES •••• 8.2fo WOULD COVER 80 Of" THE 100 PERIODS •••• A SI MILAR STUDY 
SHOWED THAT 7.6fo WOULD COVER 80 OUT OF tOO CASES USING THE PRICES OF 
THE COMP ANY' S STOCK • • • • THE CONCLUSION WAS 8fo TO BE ALLOWED FOR A GEN-
ERAL MARKET DECLINE• ** 
THE ADDITION OF THESE TWO PERCENTAGES IS 2 o% . THE PRICE ON 
WHICH IT WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED IS ON THE MARKET PRICE EX-RIGHTS, 
SINCE THAT WA S THE BASIS OF THE COMPUTATION Of"l2% TO BE ALLOWED FOR MAR-
KET PRESSURE• IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THESE COMPUTATIONS WERE 
MADE BY JOHN G. FLINT, A PART NER IN THE FIRM OF KIDDER, PEABODY & COMPANY, 
IN NO WAY CONN ECTED WITH THE COMPANY, EXCEPT IN AN ADVIS ORY CAPACITY. *** 
THE CONTENTION OF THE COMPANY- THAT A 2 o% SPREAD, REQUIRING A 
MARKET PRICE EX-RIGHTS OF $ 125• IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO REASONABLY IN-
SURE A SUCCE SSF"UL STOCK OFFERING WAS OPPOSED BY VARIOUS ARGUMENT S. THE 
* 13 p. 37 
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ARGUME NTS OPPOSING IT AS DEVELOPED BY THE COMM ISSIONS I N VERMONT AND MAs s-
ACHUSETTS WILL BE PRESENTED AS TYPICAL APPROACHES OPPOSING THE CONCLUSION 
OF THE COM PANY. 
3• MASSACHUSETT S DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 
ALLOWANCE FOR MARKET PRESSURE 
THE ATTITUDE OF THIS STATE'S COMMISSION WAS "THAT THE IMPORTANT 
THING IS TO PERMIT EARNINGS, WHICH IN VIEW OF THE COMPANY'S PAST EARNINGS 
WILL ACHIEVE THE PRIMARY OBJECT OF MAI NTAINING THE STOCK AT PAR"·* BY 
NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION COULD THE COMPANY EVER ISSUE ADDITIONAL 
STOCK IF ITS PRICE WAS TO BE CONTINUALLY ADMINISTERED TO PAR• THE PHEN-
OM ENON OF MARKET PRESSURE WAS THE REASON FOR STOCK ISSUES UNDERTAKEN BY 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH Co. AND THE PACIFIC TELEPH ONE 
& TELEGRAPH Co. IN 1948 ENDING IN FAILURE• OFFERINGS OF THEIR NE W SHARES 
WERE MADE WHEN THE MARKET PRICES OF THEIR STOCK WERE ATt OR VERY CLOSE TO, 
$ 100 . ONLY 14fo AND 2ofo, RESP ECTIVELY, OF THE STOCK OFFERED TO ·INVESTORS 
OTHE R TH AN AMERICAN WERE SOLD• ** 
THIS COMM ISSION RELIED AT VARIOUS STAGES OF THEIR HEARI NG ON 
THE PETITION OF THE COMPANY, UPON THE VIEWS OF A STATE'S WITNESS BY THE 
NAME OF WHITESI DE· THE MOST NOTABLE OF THESE OCCASIONS WHEN HIS ADVICE 
WAS ASSUMED TO BE THE "GOSPEL" WAS ON HIS VIEW THAT A "45fo DEBT RAT I 0 
WAS A SAFE LEVEL F'OR THE COMPANY•" *-** HOWEVER, THE BELIEF OF THIS SAME 
MR. WHITESIDE THAT A MARKET PRICE OF $ 120 WAS NECESSARY TO REASONABLY AS-
SURE SUC CESS TO THE STOCK FLOTATION CONTEMPLATED BY THE COMPANY EVIDENTLY 
* 12 p. 55 
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RECEIVED NO CONSI DERATION, SINCE THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION ADOPTED A 
11 MAI NTENANCE AT PAR" LEVEL• 
THAT THIS COMMISSION ASSIGNS NO VALUE TO HIS OPINION ON THE 
QUESTION OF MARKET PRICE, BUT ACCEPTED HIS CONTENTION REGARDING A 45fo 
DEBT RATIO, MAKES ONE THINK THAT THEY ONLY ACCEPTED HIS TESTIMONY THAT 
AGREED WITH THEIR PRE-CONCEIVED NOTIONS• IF SUCH IS NOT THE CASE, BUT 
THAT THEY FELT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS ON THIS ISSUE, SHOULD 
RAISE DOUETS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THEIR ACCEPTING HIS 45% DEBT RATIO, 
SINCE THE FACTORS INFLUENCING EACH ARE OF THE SAME FAMILY• 
ANOTHER BIT OF PECULIAR LOGIC USED BY THE MASSACHUSETTS COM-
MISSION REGARDING THEIR REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THIS ELEMENT OF MARKET 
PRESSURE· THEY BELI EVED THAT SINCE THE AMERICAN COMPA NY WOULD SURELY EX-
ERCISE THEIR PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHT, MARKET PRESSURE TO THE EXTENT OF THIS 
AMOUNT COULD BE ELIMINATED. * IT IS TRUE THAT THE SHARES PURCHASED BY 
THE AMERICAN COMPANY WILL NOT BE AN UPSETTING FACTOR TO THE NORMAL "BUYER-
SELLER" RELATIONSHIP NORMALLY EXISTING IN THE DAY-TO-DAY TRADING OF THE 
COMPANY'S STOCK. HOWEVER, THE BELIEF THAT DISTORTION OF THIS RELATION-
SH IP IS THE ONLY FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO "MARKET-PRESSURE" IS INCORRECT• 
A PORTION OF IT IS CAUSED BY DOUBTS BEING RAISED IN THE MINDS OF INVESTORS 
AS TO WHETHER THE PAST DIVIDEND CAN BE SUSTAINED FOR THE INCREASED NUMBER 
OF SHARES· SINGE THE NUMBER OF SHARES NEWLY ACQUIRED BY THE AMERICAN COM-
PANY ARE A PART OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SHARES UPON WHICH THE PAST DIVIDEND 
HAS TO BE MAINTAINED, THEIR EXCLUSION CAN NOT BE TOTAL, AS WOULD THE MASS-
ACHUSETTS COMMISSION HAVE A READER OF THEIR PUBLISHED REPORT BELIEVE• 
* 12 p. 54 
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THESE WERE TH E ARGUMENTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION IN SUP-
PORT OF THEIR CO NTENTION THAT THE MAINTAINING OF THE COMPANY'S STOCK AT 
OR NEAR PAR IN THE MARKET WILL BE ACCORDING FAIR TREATMENT TO BOTH THE 
COMPANY• THAT IT WOULD BE FAIR TO THE COMPANY IS NOT so, SINCE SUCH A 
MARKET PRICE: 
I• PRECLUDES THE OBTAINING OF EQUITY FUNDS IN THE 
AMOUNT NECE SSARY TO ESTABLISH A DEBT-EQUITY 
RATIO THAT WILL REASONABLY ENABLE THE COMPANY 
TO WITHSTAND THE HARDSHIPS RESULTING FROM ITS 
BUSINESS BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED DURING DOWN-
WARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE• 
2. TEMPTS T ~ E AMERICAN COMPANY TO MAKE EQUITY IN-
VESTMENTS UNDER CONDITIONS THAT OTHER INVESTORS 
WOULD SHUN, NOT BEING MOTIVATED BY THE SAME COM-
PULSION TO SEEK THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS. 
3• PENALIZES THE INVESTMENTS OF PRESENT INVESTORS 
BY NOT ALLOWING THEIR STOCK TO ASSUME THE STATURE 
OF A REASONABLY SECURE INVESTMENT, WHAT IS GENER-
ALLY THOUGHT UTILITY INVESTMENTS SHOULD BE• 
4. VERMOIIT PUBLIC UTI Ll TIES COMMISSION'S ALLOWANCE 
FOR MARKET PRESSURE 
THIS COMMISSION RECOGNIZED THE NECESSITY OF RAISING THE MARKET 
PRICE SUBSTANTIALLY ABOVE ITS PAR VALUE• HOWEVER, THE LEVEL THEY ADOPTED 
FELL FAR SHORT OF THE LEVEL DETERMINED BY THE COMPANY, NAMELY $ 114 AS OP-
POSED TO y l25 . * THIS DISCREP ANCY ARISES FROM DIFFERENT STATISTICAL COM-
PUTATIONS BEING MADE UPON THE SAME DATA• 
THE VERMONT COMMISSION, IN ITS APPROACH TO DETERMINE THE PROPER 
MA RKET VALUE, SAYS THAT IT IS "INDICATED BY THE DIFFERENCE BET WEEN THE 
THEORETICAL DILUTED PRICE AND THE AVERAGE PRICE OF THE STOCK DURING THE 
PERIOD WHEN SUBSCRIPTION RIGHTS ARE AVAI LABLE TO THE SHARE HOLDERS• ** 
* 20 p. I 09 
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THIS "THEORETICALLY DILUTED PRICE" IS AN ESTIMAT E OF WHAT THE MARKET PRICE 
WILL BE WHEN THE STOCK GOES EX-RIGHTS, AN ESTIMATE DETERMINED BY SUBTRACT-
lNG FROM THE MARKET PRICE EXISTING IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE STOCK OFFER-
lNG ANNOUNCEMENT THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF THE RIGH T ATTACHED TO THAT SHARE· 
THE VALUE OF THIS RIGHT IS DETERMINED BY DIVIDING THE SPREAD BETWEEN THIS 
MARKET PRICE AND THE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE BY THE NUMBER OF RIGHTS NECESSARY 
TO BUY ONE SHARE PLUS ONE ( I)• * 
THE MAIN OBJECTION TO THIS APPROACH IS THEIR USE OF THE AVERAGE 
PRICE OF THE STOCK DURING THE OFFERING• WHEN IT IS REMEMBERED THAT THE 
OCCASION OF THE PRICE OF THE STOCK OF THE COMPANY DROPPING BELOW PAR WILL 
STOP THE PUBLIC OFFERING, THE EVENT TO BE ANTICIPATED IS THE TOTAL DE-
CLINE• IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT HAS TO BE MEASURED IS THE AVERAGE DECLINE Or 
STOCK PRICES, ~THE AVERAGE PRICE DURING THE DECLINE. 
THIS APPROACH HAD FOR SOME OF ITS DATA THAT TAKEN FROM STOCK 
ISSUES THAT FAILED· THE COMPANY, IN THEIR BRIEF TO THE VERMONT SUPREME 
COURT, TARTLY SUMMARIZED THE IMPROPRIETY Or INCLUDING THESE UNSUCCESSFUL 
OFFERINGS BY STATING, "CERTAINLY AN UNSUCCESSFUL ISSUE OFFERS NO GUIDE TO 
THE AMOUNT NECESSARY TO GIVE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS." ** 
THE VERMONT COMMISSION GAVE NO WEIGHT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A 
GENERAL MARKET DECLINE OCCURRING DURING THE TIME WHEN THE COMPANY IS TO 
OFFER THESE SECURITIES· ANY REASONING LEADING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ITS 
EVENTUALITY MAY BE REASONABLY EXCLUDED IS TO INFER THAT COMPANY MANAGERS 
HAVE A MIRACULOUS INSIGHT INTO THE FUTURE, AND WILL EXERCISE THEIR INFALLI-
* 20 Po 105 
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BILITY TO SELECT A PERIOD FOR THEIR OFFERING WHEN THE MARKET WILL BE STAT-
IC, OR MOVING IN AN UPWARD DIRECTION. ABILITY TO FORECAST THE FUTURE WITH 
SUCH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY IS NOT POSSESSED BY ANY HUMAN, OR GROUP OF HUMANS• 
D. WHAT.!.§. .!J:!S. "CURRENT CosT QE. EoUITY CAPITAL" 
I• COMPANY AS OF 1948 DETERMINED THE COST OF 
EoUITY CAPITAL TO THEM TO BE 9% 
As HAS BEEN STATED BEFORE, IF EQUITY MONEY IS SOUGHT IT MUST 
BE ENTICED BY OFFERING TO INVESTORS THAT RATE OF RETURN ON THEIR MONEY 
EXISTING IN THE CAPITAL MARKET AT THE TIME THE OFFERING IS TO BE MADE• 
THAT THIS LOGIC IS INEXORABLE IS BECAUSE INVESTMENTS IN UTILITY SECUR-
ITIES ARE MADE PRIMARILY FOR INCOME PURPOSES AS OPPOSED TO THE PROSPECTS 
OF SPECULATIVE PROFITS• THE ELEMENT OF APPR ECIATION IN UTILITY STOCK 
VALUES, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, HAS NOT BEEN REALIZED; SO SPECULATIONS FOR 
GAIN IN PRINCIPLE ARE USUALLY RARE, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE HAVING THE 
STATURE OF THE COMPA NY. 
THIS RATE OF RETURN THAT INVESTORS HAVE DECREED AS BE ING THEIR 
PRICE TO THE SEEKER, IS OBTAINABLE MAINLY BY INSPECTING THE PRICES THEY 
PAY FOR STOCK, AND RELATING TO IT THE DIVIDEND THEY RECEIVE• FOR EXAMPLE, 
A STOCK SELLING AT $50 WITH A REASONABLY ASSURED DIVIDEND OF $3 EQUATES 
TO A DIVIDEND YIELD OF 6fo . THIS, THEN, IS WHAT INVESTORS SAY THEY NEED 
FOR THAT PARTICULAR SECURITY, IF THEY ARE TO BE REASONABLY COMPENSATED 
FOR THE RISKS THEY BE LI EVE EXIST IN IT• 
THE COMPANY, BY ANALYZING SUC H CURRENT DATA, RELATING THEIR CON-
CLUSION TO THE PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED MARKET PRICE OF ~125, DETERMINED THAT 
EARNINGS OF g1o ON THEIR EQUITY ARE NECESSARY TO ATTRACT EQUITY IN THE A-
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AMOUNT NEEDED· * THIS 9~ RETURN BASED ON EQUITY IS NOT THE INVESTORS' 
RATE OF RETURN IN TERMS OF DIVIDEND TO PRICE PAID· THE INVESTORS' RATE 
OF RETURN IS LESS THAN THAT, BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SPREAD BETWEEN 
WHAT THE INVESTOR PAYS AND WHAT THE COMPANY NETS FR OM THE OFFERING. THE 
EARNING RATE ON THESE NET PR OCEEDS MUST BE HIGHER TO MAKE UP FOR THAT 
PORTION OF THE INVESTOR'S COST THAT IS ABSORBED BY ALL FINANCING COSTS• 
2. TESTING COMPANY's 9% CONCLUSION 
A TEST AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE COMPANY CONCLUDING THAT EARN-
INGS OF 91o ON THEIR EQUITY ARE NECESSARY, CAN BE MADE BY ANALYZING THE 
EARNINGS, DIVIDENDS AND PRICE PER SHARE AT THE TIME WHEN IN QUESTION-
NAMELY 1948- OF THE SAME 15 OPERATING ELECTRIC UTILITIES THAT WERE USED 
PREVIOUSLY AS CRITERIA TO AID IN ESTABLISHING THE COMPANY'S PROPER DEBT 
RAT IO• THE BELIEF IS THAT THIS DATA WILL BE MARKEDLY REPRESENTATIVE Of 
WHAT INVESTORS WANT IN THE NATURE OF DIVIDEND YIELD, PLUS WHAT PREPONDER-
ANT UTILITY MANAGEMENT OPINION IS REGARDING A PROPER PROVISION FOR SURPLUS 
WH EN EARNINGS ARE AVAILABLE FOR IT• 
TABLE VI, ON PAGE 47, SHOWS THAT THE MEDIAN DIVIDEND YIELD FOR 
THESE 15 OPERATING UTILITIES IN 1948, BASED ON THE YEAR's HIGHEST STOCK 
PRICES, WAS 5-5~· THEIR MEDIAN DIVIDEND YIELD WHEN RELATED TO THEIR LOW-
EST PRICE FOR THE YEAR WAS 6.4~. SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THESE TWO LEVELS WAS 
LOCATED THE YEAR 1 S AVERAGE DIVIDEND YIELD FOR THESE SECURITIES• 6~ IS 
THE ARITHMETIC AVERAGE OF THE 1948 DIVIDEND YIELD WHICH INVESTORS WANTED 
FOR THESE SECURITIES· THE UNAVAILABILITY OF MORE DATA PRECLUDES AN AP-
PROACH OTHER THAN THE ARITHMETIC AVERAGE• THEIR MEDIAN AS TO WITHHOLDING$ 
* 21 P • I 09 
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OF EARNINGS FROM DIVIDENDS iAS 2qfo, WHICH WERE, IN EFFECT, ADDITIONS TO 
SURPLUS• 
APPLYING THESE TWO PERCENTAGES TO THE PRE-DETERMINED MARKET 
PRICE OF' $125• THE 6'}~ DIVIDEND YIELD WOULD REQUIRE A DIVIDEND OF $7-50. 
THE F'ACT THAT 2ofo WAS BEING WITHHELD FROM EARNINGS WAS AN INFLUENCING 
FACTOR ON THAT 6'fo . IF IT HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT, THE DIVIDEND RATE WOULD 
HAVE PROBABLY BEEN HIGHER DUE TO GREATER RISKS CONSIDERED ATTENDANT IN 
SECURITIES NOT PROPERLY SHELTERED FROM THE ILL WINDS OF DEPRESSED BUSI-
NESS CONDITIONS. THEREFORE, USING THIS FACTOR OF 20'/o OF EARNINGS PER 
SHARE AS A PROPER PROVISION FOR SURPLUS PER SHARE, WOULD REQUIRE THE 
~· COMPANY TO SET ASIDE ~ J.SO PER SHARE, PER YEAR• THE ADDITION OF' ~7.50 
AND ~t.SO EQUALS $9 .30, WHICH WOULD EQUATE TO 9.3f. OF THE COMPANY'S CAP-
IT AL STOCK• 
THIS "TEST OF VALIDITY" MAY BE CONSIDERED AS CLOSELY APPROACH-
lNG 11 F'ACT 11 IN ITS RESULT THAT EARNINGS FOR THE COMPANY OF $9 .30 PER 
SHARE ARE NEEDED TO FAVORABLY COMPARE WITH OTHER LIKE INVESTMENTS. THIS 
WOULD BE SO ABSOLUTELY IF THE RISKS ON ALL UTILITIES COULD BE MADE EQUAL 
SIMPLY BY MANIPULATION OF DEBT RATIOS• HOWEVER, THERE ARE OTHER F'ACTORS 
CONTRIBUTI NG TO THE FI NAL MEASUREMENT OF "SECURITY RISK", AS VIEWED IN 
THE EYES OF INVESTORS• SOME OF THESE CONTRI BUTING FACTORS, AMONG OTHERS, 
ARE THE EMOTIONS OF INVESTORS, THEIR ANTICIPATION AS TO FUTURE YIELDS, 
THE ELEMENT OF MANAGERIAL ABILITY AND THE IMMEDIACY OF RATE HEARINGS• 
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TABLE VI 
DIVJDEf\!D YIELD FOR OPERATING 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN 1948 
D IVIDEND YIELD 
AT 
HIGHEST PRICE LOWEST PRICE 
OF STOCK IN OF STOCK IN 
COMPANY YEAR YEAR 
OS TON ED ISON Co. 5-5 6.3 
COMMONWEALTH EDISON Co. 4.9 5.7 
DETROIT En I SON Co. 5-5 6. 
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUM-
INATI NG Co. 4.7 5.8 
CONSOLIDATED GAS ELECTRIC 
LIGHT & POWER COMPANY OF 
BALTIMORE 5 ·I 6.5 
DuQ£sNE LIGHT Co. N.A. r-.J.A. 
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC 4.8 5.9 
PU BLIC SERV ICE ELECTRIC 
GA s Co. 3-2* 4.* 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ED! SON 
Co., Lrn. 4.9 6. 
CONS OLIDATED EDISON Co. OF 
NEw YORK, INC· 6.4 7-6 
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co. 5S 6.7 
PE NN . PowER & LIGHT Co. 5.9 7-2 
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC Co 5-4 6.6 
CoNsUMERS PowER Co . 5.6 6.9 
UNION t LECTRIC Co. OF 
[1,1 1 SSOUR I N.A. N.A. 
MEDIAN 5S * 6.4 * 
* OMITTED IN AVERAGES DUE TO EXTREMENESS OF DATA 
'fo EARNINGS 
W1 THHELD 
FROM D IV !DENDS 
• 17 
• 19 
• 19 
-33 
.20 
N.A. 
.25 
62.9* 
1·8 
3·1 
2.7 
4.1 
1·9 
1·9 
N.A. 
.20 * 
N.A. No MARKET PRICE OF STOCK - WHOLELY OWNED SUBSIDIARIES 
SouRcE: MOODY'S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS - 1949 
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THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS WHAT NET EARNINGS ON EQUITY WOULD BE, 
USING 9.3fo FOR STOCK AND 6f, FOR SURPLUS· THE REASONING BEHIND USING THIS 
6fo RATE FOR SURPLUS IS BY RECOGNIZING THAT THESE SURPLUS FUNDS, WHICH ARE 
INVESTORS' FUNDS, ENTERED INTO THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMPANY WITH-
OUT THE FINANCING COSTS THAT EXIST WHEN CAPITAL IS OBTAINED BY SELLING 
STOCK ON THE MARKET• 
TABLE VII 
NET EQU I TV EARNING REQU I RBv1Efl!fS FOR THE CavlP ANY 
(AFT ER TAXES) AS OF DECEtvB ER 3 1 , 1 949 
CLASS AMOUNT EARNING RATE NET EtRN I NGS 
Corv1M ON SrocK* 25 I , 3 7 6, I 00 9.3fo 23,377,977 
SURPLUS * 13,255,664 6. 795,340 
264,631 '764 9. •fa 24,173,317 
SOURCE: As SHOWN IN TABLE V 
THIS TABLE IS STRONG EVIDENCE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE COMPANY'S 
CONTENTION THAT EARNINGS ON EQUITY OF 9f, ARE REQUIRED TO SECURE CAPITAL 
IN THE PRESENT MARKET, SINCE THE PRECEDI NG "TEST FOR VALI DI TY" RESOLVES 
TO A 9.1 fo RETURN ON EQUITY• 
IN THE FACE OF THESE INC ONTROVERTIBLE FACTS ESTABLISHING THE 
NEED OF A 9f, RETURN BEING ALLOWED ON THE EQUITY PORTION OF THE COMPANY's 
CAPITAL, REGULATORS ARRIVE AT A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION• THE REASON WHY 
THESE COMMISSIONS DIFFER IS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT SUBMIT TO THE COMPULSION 
IMPLIED BY THE TERM 11 CURRENT COST 11 • INSTEAD THEY EMBARK ON LENGTHY AND 
DETAILED EXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL FACTS RELATED TO, BUT NOT THE SAME AS, 
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THE PRESENT• THEY INFER THAT THEY ARE THE SAME BY THEIR NEGLECTING TO 
GIVE EXPR ESSION TO PRESENT FACTS IN THEIR FINAL DETERMINATION• 
SINCE WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE CONTENTIONS OF THE MA SS-
ACHUSET TS AND VERMONT COMMISSIONS REGARDING THE "MARKET PRICE" PROBL EM, 
IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO EXPLORE THEIR RESP ECTIVE APPROACHES FOLLOWED 
TO DETERMINE THEIR RESPECTIVE RATES OF RETURN• 
3· MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT Of PUBLIC UTILITIES 
DETERMINATION OF "CUR RE NT COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL" 6% 
THIS COMMISSION MADE NO PERCEPTI BLE ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE 
CURRENT COST OF CAPITAL• INSTEAD, THEY EXAMINED THE HISTORICAL PE RFORM-
ANCE OF THE COMPANY AS TO ITS DIVIDEND, DIVIDEND-YIELD IN PERCE NT, AND 
MARKET PRICE• ON THE BASIS OF THAT HISTORICAL PERUSAL, THEY CO NCLUDED: 
" 0 uR DETERMINATION Of A 6'/o DIVIDEND RATE FOR 
THE COMMON STOCK IS BASED LARGELY ON THE DATA 
•••• WHICH SHOWS THE PRICE, EARNINGS AND DIV-
IDEND-YIELD RELATIONSHIP Of THE COMMON STOCK 
OF THE COMPANY FROM 1920 TO 1947, TOGETHER 
WITH AVERAGES FROM 1920 TO t932, 1933 TO !946, 
AND 1939 TO t946." * 
"IT IS OUR OPINION THAT THE PERIOD FROM 1933 TO 
THE PRESENT TI ME IS MORE TYPICAL AND REPRESENT-
ATIVE Of THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE COMPANY 
MUST OPERATE, AND WE MAKE OUR DETERMINATION Of 
ITS EQUITY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS ACCORDINGLY•" ** 
THE fOREGOING CONCLUSION WAS MADE EVEN THOUGH THE COMMISSION 
QUOTED THIS FOLLOWING STATEMENT, MADE BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION, AS A DEFINITION OF THEIR APPROACH: 
* 12 p. 57 
** 12 p. 58 
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"BY 'CURRENT COST OF CAPITAL' IS MEANT THE 
COST WHICH WOULD BE INCURRED BY A GIVEN 
UTILTTY IF IT WERE TO SECURE ITS ENTIRE 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER CURRENT MARKET 
CONDIT I ONS•" * 
No INTERPRETATION OF THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING QUOTATION CAN 
CORRECTLY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ITS DIRECTIVE IS COMPATIBLE WITH 
THEIR CONCLUSION "THAT 1933 TO THE PRESENT TIME IS MORE TYPICAL AND REP-
RESENTATIVE OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE COMPANY MUST OPERATE•••••" 
/rAN AVERAGE OF THE PAST IS THE SAME AS THE PRESENT, IT IS PURELY THROUGH 
COINCIDENCE· THAT COINCIDENCE EXISTS IN THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT SO. 
THE ONLY CONCLUSION THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM THIS ACTION ON THE 
PART OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION IS THAT THEY BELIEVED THAT THE PRE-
SENT RATE OF RETURN AS COMPUTED BY "CURRENT COST" WOULD DECREASE IN THE 
FUTURE TO A 6fo RETURN, THEREBY ALLOWING THE COMPANY TO ATTRACT EQUITY CAP-
ITAL AT THAT TIME. 
THAT SUCH A CONCLUSION IS JUSTIFIED IS BASED ON THE STATEMENT BY 
THIS COMMISSION 11 NOR CAN WE AGREE THAT WISDOM DICTATES THE COURSE OF ISSU-
lNG $ 100,000,000 NEW EQUITY CAPITAL ALL AT ONCE, INSTEAD OF IN APPROPRIAT.E 
UNITS, AS OCCASION AND THE MARKET PERMIT•" ** IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE 
AWAITING THE TIME WHEN THE EQUITY RETURN REQUIRED BY INVESTORS RETURNS TO 
THE AVERAGE OF 1933 TO 1946. THE CERTAINTY OF THAT TRANSPIRING IS NOT 
KNOWN AS A FACT, AND TO GAMBLE WITH THE FUTURE OF THE COMPANY ON THIS UN-
CERTAINTY, IS TO CLEARLY OVER-EXTEND THEIR RI GHTS AS REGULATORS• THAT 
* 12 p. 44 
** 12 p. 55 
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THEY DO NOT HAVE THIS RIGHT IS IMPLIED IN THE SUPREME COURT DIRECTIQE AS 
CONTAINED IN THE SOUTHWESTERN BELL CASE: 
11
• • • • EsT I MATES FOR TOMORROW CA NNOT IGNORE 
PRICES OF TODAY •" * 
4. VERMONT's PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION DETERMINATION 
OF CURRENT CosT OF EoUITY CAPITAL TO BE 6.65~ 
THIS COMMISSION, AS DID MASSACHUSETTS, ACCORDED TO THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF "CURRENT C0ST11 NOTHING MORE THAN LIP SERVICE• THEY USED A HIS-
TORICAL RELATIONSHIP CONSISTING OF AVERAGING THE RELATIONS OF THE COMPANY's 
EARNINGS IN PAST YEARS TO THE AVERAGE PRICE OF THE COMPANY'S STOCK PAID 
DURING THOSE YEARS WITH THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1939 TO 1946. THEY THEN REA-
SONED THIS RELATIONSHIP CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE THE "CURRENT COST OF 
EQUITY CAPITAL 11 , WHICH THEY THEN PROCEEDED TO ESTABLISH AS 6 .65fc · ** 
THE USE OF SUCH A PROCEDURE IMPLIES THAT THE ONLY FACTOR INFLU-
ENCING STOCK PRICES ARE HISTORICAL EARNINGS• OBVIOUSLY, SUCH IS NOT THE 
CASE, AS DID THE VERMONT COMMISSION LATER ADMIT WHEN THEY SAID THAT PRICE 
"AT ANY GIVEN I NSTANT MAY BE AFFECTED BY A VARIETY OF CIRCUMSTANCES, IN-
CLUDING YIELD TO STOCKHOLDERS IN DIVIDE NDS, ANTICIPATED FUTURE YIELDS, 
CUR RENT POLITICAL FACTORS, PRICE TRENDS IN THE GENERAL MARKET, DEBT RATIO 
OF THE COMPANY •••• AND, SOMETIMES EMOTIONs, FEARS AND HOPES• *** To ADMIT 
THE LATTER QUOTATION AS FACT, WHILE STILL MAINTAINING THE ONLY AREA TO BE 
INVESTIGATED IS THE RATIO OF EARNINGS TO PRICE, IS TO BELIEVE THAT THE AG-
GREGATE INFLUENCE OF THESE OTHER FACTORS IS A FIXED QUANTITY CHANGING IN 
THEIR TOTAL INFLUENCE NOT ONE IOTA FROM YEAR TO YEAR• To BELIEVE THIS OCCURS, 
IS TO PLACE GREAT STRAIN ON CREDIBILITY• 
* 2 p. 295 
** 21 p. 62 
* -l(""* 12 p. t49 
E. CONCLUSION 
THE COMPANY'S CONTENTION THAT EARNINGS OF 9fo ON EQUITY WERE 
NECESSARY IN 1949 CAN NOT BE REFUTED BY RESORT TO THE REASONINGS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS AND VERMONT REGULATORY AGENCIES• IT IS ALSO REASONABLE 
TO BELIEVE THAT THESE REGULATORS KNEW SO THEMSELVES• WHY, THEN, DID THEY 
ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY A RETURN LESS THAN gfo FOR EQUITY? 
THE ANSWER SEEMS TO BE SIMPLY THAT DECIDING LESS THAN 9fo PRE-
CLUDES THE COMPANY FROM ACHIEVING ANY LONG TERM DEBT RATIO OTHER THAN 
THE REGULATORS' RATES OF 45fo• SHOULD THE COMPANY ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THEIR 
OBJ ECTIVE OF A 35~ RATIO WITH THE MA RKET PRICE THEIR REGULATION WOULD EF-
FECT, THE POSSIBILITY OF INVESTORS OTHER THAN AME R ICAN SUBSCRIBING TO THE 
OFFE RING WOULD BE NIL• THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO SINCE THE PRICE OF ITS THEN 
OUTSTANDING SHARES WOULD NO DOUBT DROP BELOW THEIR PAR VALUE BEFORE THE 
OFFER ING WAS TOO MANY DAYS ALONG• THE POSSIBILITY OF INVESTOR INTEREST 
LATER BECOMING ACTIVE FOR THAT OFFERING IS THEN TO BE CONSIDERED REMOTE• 
WITH THE AMERICAN COMPA NY SUBSCRIBI NG TO THE FULL EXTENT OF THEIR 68. gfo 
BEFOR E THE MARKET VALUE DROPPED BELOW IT S PAR VALUE, WOULD CREATE A DEBT 
RATIO OF 41.2f. . THIS WOULD SATISFY REGULATORS IN THEIR OBJECTIVE OF 
CREATING A DEBT RATIO OF 45fo . TABLE No. Vlf I SHOWS HOW THIS WOULD OCCUR• 
T ABLE VIII 
EFFECT ON COMPANY'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
IF ONLY AMER IC AN SUBSCR IB ED T O OFFER-
ING. (AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1949) 
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TABLE VI I I CONTINUED 
AFTER SUBSCRI PTION 
BEFO RE OFFERING * BY AMERICAN 
AMOUNT 
...L.. AMOUNT __L_ 
LONG TERM DEBT 135,000,000 33-2% 135,ooo ,ooo 33-2% 
ADvANCEs I 03 ,300, 000 2j' ·3 32,795,700 8. 
TOTAL DEBT 238,300,000 58.5'fo 167,795,700 41 .2'fo 
TOTAL EQUITY 168,825,764 41 ·5 234,836,064 58.8 
TOTAL CAPITAL 407' 125,764 1 oofo 407 , I 25 , 7 64 10C1/o 
* ANNUAL REPORT OF COMPANY - 1949 
BELIEF THAT THE ABOVE ANALYSIS TO BE THE INTE NT AND REASONING 
OF THESE REGULATORS IS WELL SUBSTANTIATED BY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT OF 
THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION: 
" AMERICAN WILL EXERCISE ITS RIGHTS TO 
THE NE W ST OCK IF THE EARNINGS JUSTIFY A 
PRICE OF PAR OR BETTER• WE ARE UNABLE TO 
PERC EIVE ANY REASONS WHY AMERICAN SHOULD 
NOT EXCHANGE ITS HOLDINGS OF NOTES BEAR-
ING INTEREST AT 2.75fo FOR COMM ON STOCK OF 
TWICE THAT YIELD•" * 
THE ABOVE PROCEDURE IS THAT WHICH IS DES IGNED TO FORCE THE AM-
ERICAN COMPANY TO SEEK THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS, EITHE R DEBT INVESTMENTS 
IN A FIRM HAVING TOO MUCH DEBT, OR EQU I TV INVESTMENTS IN THE SAME FIRM 
THAT LESS CLOSELY RELATED AN D NOT SIMILARLY MOTIVATED INVESTORS WOULD SHUNo 
To FORCE THAT DECISION ON THE AMERICAN COMP ANY IS FORGETTI NG THEIR PREVI OUS 
* 12 p. 54 
53 
WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO AVAIL LARGE SUMS Of EXPANSION MONEY TO THE COM-
PANY, AND ALSO TO JEOPARDIZE THE SAVINGS OF THOSE WHO ENTRUSTED THEIR 
FUNDS TO THE PRUDENCE Of THE AMERICAN COMPANY MANAGEMENT ON THE ASSUMPTION 
THAT REGULATION WOULD BE JUST AND EQUITABLE• 
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1 V CONCLUS I Cl\l 
A. NET EARN I NG RE <JUIREME NTS .E.QB. THE COMPANY. 
I • I 948 - I 949 
As WAS ORIGINALLY STA TED, THIS T HESIS EVALUATED THE RESPECT IV E 
CONTENTIONS OF THE COM PAN Y AND THE I R REGULATORS RE GARDI NG THE ISSUE OF 
WHAT EAR N INGS ARE PROPER FOR THE COMPANY TO EXPER IENCE• THE PRECEDI NG 
CHAPTERS PRESENTED THESE REASON I NGS ON THE VARI OUS SUBJECTS THAT ULTI-
MATELY RESOLVE I NTO THE Pt hi AL DETERM i i'liAT ION. T HE BELIEF S OF THE CCY.vlPANY 
ALONG THI S P ROC E:CURAL PATH LEADI NG TO THE ANSWER WERE BASED UPON ACCEPTED 
MAN AGEMENT PRACTICES AND ECONOI'v!IC ANALY SIS , BOTH CAPABLE OF BEING LABELL-
ED A ''COMMON SENSE" APPROACH• THE EF"F'ECT OF THE COMPANY'S OBJECTIVE RE-
GARD I NG A 35% LONG TERM DEBT RAT IO, THEI R STATISTICAL APPROACH I N DETER-
MIN I NG FI NANCI NG COST S AND THEIR CONCLUSim~s AS TO THE "CURRENT COST OF 
EQUITY CAPITAL" LOGICALLY DEVELOPED THE NECESSIT Y OF THEIR EQUITY CAPITAL 
EARNING A RETURN OF 9%. 
To OPPOSE T HE CONCLUS IONS OF THE COMPAI>JV, REGULATORS PURSUED 
ILLOGICAL THEORIES• THI S ACTION BY REGULATORS CAN MOST L IKELY BE ATTRIBUT-
ED TO ANXIETY ON THE IR PART TO SUPPRESS UPWARD RATE REVISIONS OF THE COM-
PANY'S RATE STRUCTURE• THIS ANX I ETY IS PROBABLY POLITICALLY MOTIVATED-
ESPECIALLY WITH PRESENT DAY POLITICAL PLATFORMS BEI NG BUTTRESSED BY POL-
ITIC AL PROMISES TO SOLVE OUR ECONOMY's PRESEfH PR ICE DILEiviMA· THESE POI,..-
ITICAL PRO!I.HSES TAKE SHAPE BY OFF'ICE SEEKERS PROMISING PRICE REDUCTIONS• 
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ON A STATE LEVEL, THE ONLY PRICES STATE ADM I NISTRATORS EfFECT-
1 VEL Y CONTROL ARE THOSE OF UT ILI T I ES• IN ORDER FOR AN ADM l1 I STRATI ON 
NOT TO EMBARRASS ITSELF, IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO SUPPRESS UTILITY RATES 
TO UNREALIST ICALLY LOVI LEV ELS • To DO THIS, REGULATORS HAVE HAD TO ATTEMPT 
TO RAT I ONALIZE AWAY THE STARK ECONOMIC REALIT I ES OF TODAY BY RESORT TO 
VAGUE THEORIES AND IMPROPER STATISTICAL TECHN IQUES• SUCH APPROACHES ARE 
ALLUR I NGLY DECEPTIVE BUT FAIL TO WITHSTAND SCRUTINY AS TO "COMMON SENSE", 
ECONOt.H cs, OR PRECEDENT • 
IT IS APPROPRIATE TO MENT I ON THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REGU-
LATED AND REG ULATORS ON WHAT RETURN IS PROP ER I S NOT AUTOMATIC ASSUR ANCE 
THAT SUCH A RATE OF RE TURN WILL BE ACH IEVED• PROPER RATES MUST BE ESTAB-
LISHED THAT WI LL YI ELD REVENUES I N AN AMOUNT SUFFIC I ENT TO LEAVE A RESIDUE 
AFTER COSTS WHICH WILL EQUATE TO THE 9fc. THESE TWO ELEMENTS OF RATES AND 
COSTS ARE ALSO AREAS OF REGULATORY ACT IVI TY, AND I MPROP ER ALLOWANCES FOR 
THESE ITEMS WOULD NATURALL Y RESULT I N ACTUAL EARNINGS BEING REMOVED FROM 
THE PRE-DETERMINED GOAL• HOWEVER , THIS THES IS DOES NOT PURSUE WHAT RATES, 
AND WHAT COSTS, ARE NECESSARY AND PROPER• THESE AREAS OF THE REGULATORY 
CYCLE EXTEND BEYOND THE ABILITY OF THIS TH ES IS TO HANDLE PROPERLY• 
2. 1949 - ? 
IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NO SET OF' RATES CAN BE DEV I SED WHI CH WILL 
EFFECT NET EARN INGS BE ING EXACTLY gfo OF' EQU ITY• IN ACTUAL OPERAT ION, THE 
9lc IS BUT A GOAL TO SEEK· RATES ONCE DETERM I NED BASED UPON EST IMATES OF 
FUTURE DEMAND AND COSTS MAY YIELD EARNINGS EITHER SOMEWHERE IN EXCESS OF 
THE 9f. , AS THEY MA Y AL SO YIELD LESS• FURTHER ACT I ON AS TO RATE REVIS I ONS 
WILL THEN DEPEND UPON THE DEGREE OF DIF FERENCE BETWEEN THE "REALIZED 
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EARNINGS" AND THE THEN " COST OF MONE Y"· 
WHAT DEGREE OF DI FFERENCE WO ULD I ND I CATE THE NEED FOR RATE 
STRUCTURE CAN NOT BE ADEQUATELY CONTEMPLATED NOW . THAT TH I S IS SO IS BE-
CAUSE OF THE IMPROBABIL ITY OF CORRE CTLY ANT ICI PAT I NG THE FUTURE CAUSES• 
SOME CAUSES COULD BE OF THE SHORT- RUN VARI ETY, DISTORT I NG A REASONABLE 
PROJECT I ON INTO THE FUTURE I F GI VEN UNDUE WE IGHT • T o I MPOSE RATE RE• 
VIS I CNS FOR EVERY SUCH CHANGE WOULD WORK SEVERE HARDSH IPS UPON MANAGE-
MENT AND REGULATORS · RAT HER , THESE CAUSES SHOULD BE CAREF ULL Y CALCULATED 
AS TO THE PROBAB ILI TY OF THE IR REMAIN ING I N I NF LU ENCE• 
A REASON ABLE ASSUMPT ION CAN BE MADE THA T TH E RATES NECESSARY 
AND PROPER AS OF t 948 - 1949 I S NOT ADEQ UATE TODAY • GOVERNMENTAL ACTI-
VITY DES IGNED TO MA I NTA I N HI GH LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT , TO ASS URE AGRICUL-
TURAL PROSPER ITY , TO I NCREASE OUR OWN MILI TARY PREPAREDNESS WH ILE RE - ARM-
ING OUR AL LI ES , CAN HARDLY BE THOUGHT AS CONDUCIVE TO AC HI EV I NG LOWER 
PRICES• I F ANYTHING, PR I CES WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE AND THE COMPANY 
MUST BE PERM ITTED A SAFE FOOTHOLD ON THE RESULT I NG I NFLAT I ONAR Y TREADM ILL • 
8. IMPLICATIONS Q[ ~PRESENT REGULATORY PROBLE M 
I • THE PRESENT REGULATORY PROCESS MAY REQUIRE SOME CHANGE 
REGULATORY HISTOR Y ESTABLISH ES THE FACT THE TREND Ot UTIL I TY 
REGULATI ON IS I N THE DI RECT I ON OF ENCOMPASS I NG LARGER AREAS OF ACTI VITY• 
THERE I S L ITTLE LI KELIHOOD THAT THESE I NCREA SED ACTIV ITIES WIL L BE DIM-
INISHED I N THE NEAR FUTURE · WITH SUCH A POSS IBILIT Y, WHAT HAS TO BE 
\vA TCHED IS THE GA I NI NG OF POWER I N THE HANDS OF REGULATORS TO AN EXTENT 
WHICH WOULD BE UPSETT I NG TO THE NECESSARY DELICATE BALANCI NG OF I NTE RESTS 
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OF THE REGULATED AND REGULATORS• 
THERE ARE PROPONENTS FOR THE IDEA OF GRANTING TO REGULATORS 
AL MOST LI MITLESS POWER · THESE ADVOCATES ARE USUALLY SOME OF THE PRESENT 
REGULATORS, ENCOURAGED BY CERTAIN EDUCATORS• THE BAS I C PREM ISE OF THESE 
DEVOTEES OF POLITICAL CONTROL IS THAT UTIL ITY MANAGEMENT IS MANIFESTLY 
PRE0UDICI AL TO THE I NTERESTS OF SOCIETY• IT SEEMS PERTINENT TO PO INT 
OUT THAT THESE ADVOCATES ARE PROBABLY DESIROUS OF "PLAYING BUSINESS MEN"• 
THIS WRITER IS OF THE OP I NI ON THAT A REALIGNM ENT OF THE REG-
ULATORY PROCESS IS NOV/ RE QUIRED TO SAFEGUARD THE REGULATED FROM SUCH 
ACQUISITIVENESS• IT I S TRUE AN AVENUE OF APPEA~ DOES EXIST - NAMELY 
THE RIGHT TO HAVE JUDIC I AL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DEC IS I ONS. BUT SUCH RE-
LIANCE ON TH I S RI GHT OF APPEAL ENTAILS MANAGEMENT EXPENDING EFFORT WHICH 
WOULD BE BETTER SPENT IF ALLOWED TO WORK TOVIARDS PROV IDING SERV I CE RATHER 
THAN DEFEND I NG THE NEED OF PROVIDING IT • 
IT IS BELIEVED THAT SUCH A REAL I GNMENT OF REGULATION SHOULD 
BE DIRECTED TOWARDS ACCOMPLISHING A MORE ABSOLUTE SEPARATION OF THE DUAL 
ROLES NOW PLAYED BY REGULATORS --- THE PROSECUTOR AND THE JUDGE• THE EF-
FECTING OF THIS SEPARATION COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OBTA I NED BY RESORT TO THE 
DEVICE OF ARBITRATION- THE ARB ITRATORS BE I NG IN NO WAY CONNECTED TO 
EITHER THE STATE OR THE UT ILITY• 
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A MORE PRACTICAL DEV I CE, WHEN VI EWED WITH THE PROSPECTS OF AC-
COMPLISHING A CHANGE, SUPPORTED BY THE I NTERESTED PART I ES, WOULD PROBABLY 
INVOLVE THE RATE CASE TEST IMONY BEING INIT I ALLY PRESENTED TO THE JUD I CIARY• 
IT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS TO PROPERLY INI'ERPRET THE SOCI AL,ECONOM IC 
AND POL I TICAL Fi\CTORS AS TO THE IR EFFECT ON OUR CONST ITUT I ONAL GUARANTEE 
OF ' 1 PRESERVATI0f~ OF PR I VATE PRQPERTY 11 , A FUNCT I ON REGULATORS ARE RECENTLY 
ASSUMING TO BE THE I RS • 
REGULATORS ADM IT TO THE UNFA IRNESS OF THE IR BE I NG BOTH PROSE-
CUTOR AND .JUDGE • To CIRCUMVENT OUTSIDE OBJECTION TO THIS SITUI1TION THEY 
ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN AURA OF IMPART I ALI TY BY APPO I NT I NG OUTS IDE EXPERTS 
OR BY DELEG ATI NG THE PROSECUT ION TASK TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DE PARTMENT • 
THIS DEV ICE IS UN ABLE TO DO AWAY WITH THE OB.J EC TI ONS S I NCE THE SEPARAT I ON 
IS ONLY ON PAPER , WITH THE ROLE OF' PROSECUTOR AND ,J UDGE STILL BE I NG VEST -
ED IN ONE ENTITY• 
T HE PRECEDING PROPOSAL IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS A BLANKET 
I ND I CTMENT OF ALL REGULATORS • Wt-IAT THE DI SC USS I ON SHOU LD BR ING OUT I S 
THAT NOT ALL CASES ARE DECIDED BY TRU LY OB.J ECT IVE REGUL ATORS , AND SOME 
ASSURANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO I NVESTORS THAT THEIR F'UNDS WILL NOT BE AR-
BITRARILY TREATED· OPPOSIT I ON TO THE PROPOSAL THAT A REALIGNMENT IS I N 
ORDER BY REGULATORS WOULD BE DIFFICULT F'OR THEM TO SUSTAI N, S I NCE ITS PUR-
POSE IS ONLY TO TAKE FROM THEM THE FUNCT ION OF A JUDGE OF THEIR OWN CASE, 
A SITUATION THEY WOULD OP POSE SHOULD THE UT ILITIES ENJOY THE PRIV ILEGE • 
2. GREATER PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AN AtD I N EFFECTI NG PRUDENT 
UTILITY REGULATION 
THIS THES IS PREV I OUSL Y SUBM ITTED THE PROPOSITION THAT PRESENT 
POLITICAL TACT ICS ARE TO BE CO NS IDERED AN I MPORTANT SOURCE OF THE REGU LA-
TORY DIFFICULT I ES CURRENTLY SURRO UNDING HIE COMP ANY. THE ABILITY OF THESE 
POLIT I CAL TACTICS TO MA I NTAI N SUPREMACY OVE R THE REALITIES THAT IMPEACH 
SUCH POLIT I CAL ACT I ON, IS UNDOUBTEDLY SUSTAINED BY THE GENERAL PUBL I C'S 
NORiviAL REACT I ON OF LAfvlENT I NG PRICE I NCREASES• HOWEVER, THE EXTENT TO 
WHICH REG ULATO RS CAN RE ACH I N APPEALING TO THESE MOT IVES IS I NFLUENCED BY 
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NEW HAMPSHIRE 
14. COMPANY' s..{3 R I EF TO SUPREME COURT ON ORDER _OF DEC• 1947. 
FEBRUARY 1948 
15 • STATE's BRIEF TO SuP REME Cou~T ON ORDER OF DEC• 1947. 
FEBRUARY 1948 . 
16 . COMPANY'S BRIEF TO SuPREME COURT ON ORDER OF JuLY 1948. 
DEC EMBER IS' 48. 
17· StATE'S BRIEF TO SUPREME COURT ON ORDER OF JULY 1948. 
DECEMBER 1948. 
R.!;!ODE I BLAND 
18. COMPANY's BRIEF ON DOCKET No . A-29. AUGUST, 1949. 
19 • PUBLIC UT ILITY HEAR ING BOARD 's ORDER ON DOCKE T A-29. 
DECEMBER, 1949. 
VERMONT 
20. STATE 1 S BRIEF ON DocKET No. 1775· AUGUST, 1950· 
21. COMPA NY'S BRIEF ON DOC KET No. 1775• AUGUST, 1950. 
22. RECORD ON APPEALS OF COMPANY ON DocKETS Nos. 1773 AND 1775 • 
JULY, 1950. 
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